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This thesis is based on the presumption that a Palestinian
Homeland exists. As such, it reviews some of the key legal
documents which have formed the political and historical back-
ground of Palestine from the Balfour Declaration of 1917 to
the present day. These documents are reviewed in light of basic
principles of international law as viewed by European and
American jurists and scholars relative to questions of sover-
eighnty, title to territory and the implication of recognition
by third states. Finally, this thesis briefly analyzes some
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In analyzing the legal implications of a Palestinian home-
land one must look at a number of issues and events not only
from an international legal framework but from an historical
and political aspect as well. It is easily understood that
the whole Middle East has been a volatile area in the inter-
national system for decades and one tends to become quickly
overwhelmed by both the issues and the number of actors. Yet,
it is important to realize that any discussionof a Palestinian
homeland is not only a pivotal issue but that it is fraught
with emotions which have not just clouded the problems but
have, concomitantly, shaped the situations. Thus, any legal
study of Palestine must look at not only the documents which
have become an integral part of Palestinian- Israeli history
but also the historical context in which these documents were
derived. As such, it is virtually impossible to separate the
legal questions from the political aspects of the issues.
The first chapter provides an historical background to the
development of certain legal documents relating to the political
situation in Palestine. These particular documents were chosen
for two reasons; either because they had a significant legal
effect on events in Palestine or they highlighted historical
and political issues with regard to events in the area. Several
of these documents fit both criteria.

The second chapter analyzes these legal documents in light
of generally accepted principles of international law among
European and American jurists and scholars. This chapter is
based on the premise that a Palestinian state exists. Thus,
questions of sovereignty and title to territory are scrutinized
in light of these documents and principles of international law.
The third chapter looks at Israel as a "mandatory" govern-
ment in the Occupied Territories. Since an emergent Palestinian
state would most likely grow out of the Occupied Territories,
it seemed valuable to look at Israeli policy as a military occu-
pant. Israeli conduct in this area will certainly have an effect
on the shape of a new Palestinian state.
Finally the last chapter looks at some of the legal arguments
concerning an emerging Palestinian state and makes some observa-
tions about the issues which might arise as a result of such a
state
.
Of the legal documents discussed in the first chapter, the
Balfour Declaration is of particular importance. It was the
first policy statement by a world power, Great Britain, in
support of a national home for Jews. It had as many antagonists
as supporters. British legislators and policy-makers split
over the document. So were the Jews themselves. In working
out the final draft one can see the forces of Jewish assimila-
tionists opposing political Zionists. The result was a vaguely
worded declaration which satisfied no one. Be that as it may,
the Balfour Declaration was incorporated into the League of
Nations mandate for Palestine thus providing it with the force
of international concensus.

The Palestine Mandate and the Palestine Order in Council
of August 10, 1922, provided the necessary legal documents
for the administration of Palestine under the League of Nations
Mandate System. The link between the Mandate System under the
League and the Trusteeship System administered by the United
Nations is provided in a series of legal decisions under the
heading of The South-West Africa Cases . These were concerned
with the administration of South-West Africa by the Union of
South Africa.
The reports of the various commissions sent to the area by
the United States and Great Britain and the policy statements
which resulted from these reports are a study in frustration.
In each report one can see a rather accurate, straightforward
reporting of the situation as it existed in Palestine at the
time of the report. However, the policy statements generated
by these reports reflect another reality; i.e., a British ad-
ministration caught on the horns of a dilemma trying to
placate both Arabs and Jews but succeeding only in fueling
hostilities between the two groups and toward itself. This
was largely a result of the perceptions of the Arabs and Jews
concerning the legal implications of the policy statements and
the expectations evoked by these perceptions.
At the end of World War II the center of focus shifted
from Great Britain to the United States as Israel won inde-
pendence and the United States became Israel's strongest ally
in the international arena. Since that time the United States
has become one of the most important protagonists in the legal
issues which have revolved around the State of Israel and the
Occupied Territories.

A major difficulty of studying the legal aspects of a
Palestinian homeland is that there are as many or more legal
arguments as there are interested parties. The result is a
confusing maze of citations and legal principles used to
support each protagonist. Therefore, this thesis was limited
to a discussion of the legal principles of international law
espoused by Western jurists and scholars. The purpose of this
concentration was to narrow the field of study and to acquaint
the Middle East area specialist with the international legal
issues of a Palestinian homeland from a Western viewpoint.
Among jurists there are several contending philosophies
concerning sovereignty and title to territory and the value
of recognition by third parties in this process. What becomes
apparent is that international law is perceived as a tool by
different nations to support or vilify an existing political
situation. Through this process international law is frequently
changing to meet fluctuating world events and at the same time
is trying constantly to formulate a set of principles grounded
on past decisions by which future relations between nations can
be regulated peacefully.
Finally, the United Nations and its predecessor, the League
of Nations, and their respective judicial branches, the former
Permanent Court of International Justice and the current Court
of International Justice, have contributed significantly to the
growth of international law, especially in the minds of many
European and American jurists and scholars. As such, these
international bodies have been referred to often in the arbi-
tration of disputes in the last century and their decisions and

resolutions carry significant weight within the international
community regardless of the origin of past differences. In
fact, this has been incorporated into the Charter of the
United Nations in Article 14:
Subject to the provision of Article 12, the General
Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful
adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin
,
which it deems likely to impair the general welfare
or friendly relations among nations, including
situations resulting from a violation of the p"ro -
visions of the present Charter setting forth the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations
.
(emphasis added)
The logic of such a statement would seem to support the
idea that what is legal is largely dependent upon what is
accepted as permissible by a majority of the members of the
United Nations. While it is true that jurists in the developed
nations regard past principles of international behavior as the
basis for most international law, they recognize that present
and future requirements may dictate a new approach which is
acceptable to the majority of nations throughout the world.
In so doing they are, in effect, conferring legal status to





A. THE BALFOUR DECLARATION
When Theodor Herzl wrote his book, The Jewish State , in
1896, religious Zionism had just begun to assume a political
direction which was destined to clash head-on with Palestinian
Arabs and ultimately threaten the stability of the modern
world. Since the first Zionist Congress assembled in Basle,
Switzerland in 1897, Jews and Arabs have fought over Palestine
and the fighting, which has been both bitter and intense, has
involved the major world powers and contributed to the weaken-
ing of the economic structure of the West.
The Zionist Movement's first major victory in terms of
legal documents was the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917,
in which Lord Arthur James Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary,
communicated to Lord Rothschild, a prominant Jewish aristocrat in
Great Britain, the cabinet's official recognition of Zionist
aspirations for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The final
wording of the document was the result of an intensive struggle
between numerous interest groups in Britain at the time and a
short review of this historical document's growth from inception
to final draft is important to understand its impact.
Although Jewish tradition and rituals are replete with ref-
erences to the desire of returning to Palestine the actual
number of Jews who returned to that area of the Middle East was
but a trickle until political Zionism began to emerge. The
11

programs of Eastern Europe and Russia during the Nineteenth
and early Twentieth Centuries produced the newly formed World
Zionist Organization to seek aid in returning Jews to Palestine.
At first, this group, through Hertzl, sought assistance or at
least acquiescence from the Ottoman government in the form of
a Jewish charter company in Palestine. Failing this they
turned to the British government who offered that organization
2
a homeland in East Africa, which Hertzl would have accepted on
a temporary basis but which the Seventh Zionist Congress, led
by a Russian majority, refused to accept. There was to be no
alternative to Palestine.
Hertzl died in 1904 and Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a prominent
British chemist, led the Zionist organizational request for
assistance in Great Britain. It should be noted, that at this
time, Zionism as a political movement was composed predominantly
of Eastern European and Russian Jews who had felt the sting of
anti-Semitism on many occasions and who lived a separate and
distinct life from other Europeans in their respective nations.
The ghetto typified this distinctness and contributed greatly
to their isolation both physically and psychologically. On the
other hand Western European, British and American Jews enjoyed
a much greater degree of assimilation. For this reason political
Zionism was viewed with ambivalence if not outright hostility by
many of these Western Jews. If their Jewish religion had not
been a serious impediment in their social and economic mobility
to date, then any political movement which singled them out as
inherently different from their fellow countrymen could create
a wave of anti-Sematic feeling and jeopardize their position in
12

society. The difference between political Zionists and assimila-
tionists can be seen as a difference in their respective socio-
political environment. Thus, there were many prominent Jewish
citizens in Great Britain and the United States who went to
great lengths to repudiate the Zionist Movement. In addition,
ultra-Orthodox Jews, believing that only through divine inter-
vention would Palestine be restored to the Jews, opposed any
political attempts to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
The Zionists who were nationalists, therefore, ran headlong into
the assimilationis ts and Orthodox Jews who were unwilling to
identify themselves with such a movement.
Among other things this confrontation led to several defini-
tions of the essence of Jewishness. The assimilationists
maintained that to be a Jew meant to belong to a particular
religious belief which was no different than belonging to the
Baptist Church, Catholic Church, et cetera and one could be both
a Jew and a loyal citizen of the state in which he resided. The
Zionists, claimed that Jews, by definition, were a distinct racial
or national group and that history's treatment of the Jews has
shown them to be a separate nation distinguished by blood. Renun-
ciation, for whatever reason, could not change that character.
With such a divergence of opinion, it is not surprising that
there was little reconciliation between the two groups, nor is
it surprising that the more prominent Jews were not eager to flock
to the Zionist cause. Nevertheless, Zionism did grow, and with





As a result of developments in World War I, Britain found
the need, for a variety of reasons, to encourage Zionism. The
new Russian government under Kerensky was under a great deal of
pressure to withdraw from the war. Britain saw the opportunity
to placate Zionists as a means of encouraging Russian Jewish
leaders to support that country's continued involvement in the
war. Furthermore, the initial entry of the U.S. into the war
had been singularly lackluster and by supporting Zionism
Britain hoped to encourage American Jews to generate greater
enthusiasm for U.S. efforts. At the same time Germany was
bidding for Jewish support and Great Britain found the need to
compete in the same arena. Finally and most significantly,
the British government saw Palestine as a key area in the link
between that nation and its interests in the Indian subcontinent.
Their earlier secret agreement with France would internationalize
Palestine and although Britain had acquiescenced in the Sykes-
Picot Agreement, the fortunes of the day made a Jewish homeland
in Palestine under British control eminently more palatable.
Thus, the opportunity to show support for the Zionist Movement
was directed not from humanitarian principles, but from the more
pragmatic needs of the war.
With these factors in mind it is easy to understand the
British government's interest in negotiating with Dr. Weizmann
and Nahum Sokolow of the World Zionist Organization with the
goal of issuing some sort of declaration in support of Zionist
claims which would, in turn, meet Britain's political needs.
It seems fairly clear that the ultimate declaration was intended
to be a quid pro quo arrangement and, as such, many prominent
14

British officials, Jews included, were opposed to the entire
+ 5concept
.
During the negotiating phase, the anti-Zionist Jews of
England were led by Dr. Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State
for India, and Mr. Claude Montefiore a prominent English Jew.
The first draft of the declaration was written by ths Zionists
and presented to Lord Balfour. Its language was very strong
in not only supporting a national home in Palestine but in the
influence it gave to the Zionist Organization in terms of imple-
mentation. According to Professor W. T. Mallison, George
Washington University, this draft was fundamental in outlining
the three major objectives of the Zionists in their negotiations
with the British Government.
This draft contained three central Zionist objectives
in the wording: "that Palestine should be reconstituted
as the National Home of the Jewish people." The first
objective was that the Zionist national home enterprise
be "reconstituted," or established as a legal right,
without regard to the existing rights of the Palestinian
Arabs. The second objective was that all Jews (compre-
hensive claimed entity of "the Jewish people") be recog-
nized in law as constituting a single nationality
grouping. The third objective was that a juridical
connection be recognized in law bet\^een "the National
Home" and "the Jewish people. "6
This draft was singularly unacceptable to anti- Zionists and
Dr. Weizmann's opening gambit had to be diluted if he hoped to
get any sort of declaration from the government.
However, the key change in the final wording was a result
of efforts to meet both Jewish objections to Zionist claims to
speak for all Jews and pro-Arab objections to British support
for Zionist designs on Palestine without entirely negating support
for the Zionist Organization. This draft, named after its author,
15

Lord Milner, included two key safeguards which Dr. Weizmann
regarded as severely limiting, to Zionist objectives. Essen-
tially, it offered British support for a Jewish homeland in
Palestine but insisted that such a homeland would neither
jeopardize non-Jewish inhabitant's rights nor the rights of
other Jews throughout the world who were satisfied with their
current nationality. In fact, this draft not only seemed to
preclude any concept of British support for a Jewish state vis-
a-vis homeland in Palestine but also weakened the Zionist
Organization's attempts to speak for all Jews throughout the
world.
This was extremely important for several reasons. In the
first place it admitted that Palestine was not an empty land,
i.e. terra nullus , and that native Palestinians enjoyed certain
protected rights. Secondly,, by protecting non-Zionist Jews this
declaration indicated that the political aspirations of Zionists
were not supported by all Jews . Thus the tone of the document
would seem to propose a religious or cultural home for Jews
instead of a Jewish state. As such, it represented a victory
for the ass imilationis ts
.
Dr. Weizmann and the Zionists were forced to live with
this watered-down version when it was incorporated in the final
draft because, in the face of strong anti-Zionist opposition,
they knew they would obtain no further concessions and at least





These two safeguard clauses which appeared in the final
draft were to have singly important legal implications for the
q
Palestinian Mandate. Yet the Balfour Declaration as it stood
at that time seemed to lack any legal force to make it an in-
strument of international law in two respects. On the one hand,
the British Government lacked any judicial or political sover-
eignty in Palestine to make such a declaration and secondly,
if it was intended to be a legally binding document upon all
Palestine, it clearly violated the rights of the indigeneous
gpopulation. However, once the document was incorporated into
the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, it carried the
weight of an international concensus regardless of the efficacy
of such a document.
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed
that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting
into effect the declaration originally made on
November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His
Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers,
in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people, it being
clearly understood that nothing should be done which
might prejudice the civil and religious rights of
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the
rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
other country.
Since the Balfour Declaration was incorporated into the Mandate
for Palestine, it becomes important to examine both the wording
of the Mandate and compare it to the broader purpose of the
League of Nations Charter.
The wording in the first part of the Declaration is vague
and knowing that Montagu and Montefiore opposed this document,
in toto, it is clear that a distinction was made between Zionism




Thus, while Balfour's introductory paragraph mentions "Jewish
Zionist aspirations, the Declaration says only "Jewish people"
and is vague enough to be interpreted to suit one's desires.
However, there is absolutely nothing vague about the two safe-
guard clauses, which purport to guarantee the "civil and reli-
gious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine"
and in addition, guarantee the "rights and political status
enjoyed by Jews in any other country."
There two very specific guarantees become the focal point
of Palestinian Arab objections to the "solutions" which followed
in the wake of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine and
the ensuing conflict between Zionists and Arabs in Palestine.
It is also interesting to note that the philosophy of these
safeguards was the product of considerable debate within
Parliament in London and the net result was that the legislative
body refused to adopt the Balfour Declaration as part of the
Palestinian Mandate.
It should be mentioned that the English House of
Lords opposed the incorporation of the Balfour
Declaration in the Palestine mandate. In a debate
in the House of Lords on 21 June 1922, on a motion
declaring the mandate to be unacceptable in its
present form, Lord Islington said that it directly
violated the pledges made by His Majesty's Govern-
ment to the people of Palestine. Moreover, its
provisions concerning the establishment of a Jewish
national home were inconsistent with Article 22 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations, which had






The mandate imposes on Great Britain the responsi-
bility of trusteeship for a Zionist political
predominance where 90 per cent of the population
are non-Zionist and non- Jewish .... In fact, very
many orthodox Jews, not only in Palestine but all
over the world, view with the deepest misappre-
hension, not to say dislike, this principle of a
Zionist Home in Palestine ... .The scheme of a
Zionish Home sought to make Zionist political
predominance effective in Palestine by importing
into the country extraneous and alien Jews from
other parts of the world. . . .This scheme of
importing an alien race into the midst of a native
local race is flying in the very face of the whole
of the tendencies of the age. It is an unnatural
experiment .... It is literally inviting subsequent
catastrophe . . . .**
Lord Isling's objections seem particularly accurate as the
course of history has demonstrated; however, more than simple
visceral reactions to the program were in evidence at that time.
By incorporating the Balfour Declaration into the Palestine
Mandate, the League created a legal conflict between support for
a Jewish homeland in Palestine and protection for the rights of
native inhabitants.
B. THE PALESTINE MANDATE
President Wilson's program of Fourteen Points made the
Paris Peace Conference an arena of bitter contention. While
the Allies were drawing up the League of Nations Charter in Paris,
it become obvious to Wilson that unless he took steps to protect
the former colonies of the Central powers, the Mandate system
would merely transfer control from one European nation to another.
Thus, he proposed a joint commission with members from France,
Great Britain and the United States be sent to the Middle East to
19

ascertain the wishes of the indigeneous population before
drawing up the Mandates for Syria and Palestine. Naturally,
Great Britain and France, both of whom had specific designs
in the Middle East, objected and refused to cooperate. There-
fore, President Wilson formed his own commission which was
headed by Dr. Henry C. King, President of Oberlin College and
Mr. Charles Crane, a prominent American businessman.
This commission spent six weeks in the Spring and Summer of
1919 touring the area and interviewing the inhabitants. The
results of these interviews indicated that the Syrian and
Palestinian Arabs desired independence and union with Syria,
Palestine and Lebanon. Failing this, they would accept a
temporary mandate under the auspices of the United States or
Great Britain but, in no way did they want France to be the
mandatory power. The inhabitants were also unanimous in their
opposition to Zionism and its aims. However, the Arabs hoped
that the principles of self determination, upon which the
covenant rested, would protect their rights and negate the aims
of the Zionists as supported by Great Britain in the Balfour
14Declaration. Unfortunately, the results of the King-Crane
Commission were clearly in opposition to the French and the
British desires and were, therefore, ignored when the Palestinian
Mandate was drawn up.
Since the preponderant desires of the inhabitants were
singularly ignored in this fashion, and since the Palestinian
Mandate as it was written, was clearly in violation of the
principles of the covenant of the League of Nations, it would
appear that the findings of the King-Crane Commission, which
20

were not even made public until 1922, demonstrated that the
legal grounds for incorporating the Balfour Declaration as part
of the Palestinian Mandate were nonexistent. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the Palestinian Arabs found this Mandate
to be a legal nicety for control of their territory by a
European colonial power, and another link in a long chain of
what they perceived to be imperialist domination of Arab lands.
By the Palestine Order in Council of August 10, 1922,
Great Britain established an administrative structure over the
mandated territory which was to grow increasingly bitter,
pitting Arabs against Jews and British against both, until
May 14, 1948, when the British, frustrated and bitter, withdrew
leaving the inhabitants to their own devices. Again, to demon-
strate the impact of the Balfour Declaration, the wording of
that document also found its way into the introduction to the
British Order in Council of August 10, 1922, as part and parcel
of the avowed purpose of the Order in Council and the British
authority in Palestine.
And whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also
agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible
for putting into effect the declaration originally
made on November 2, 1917, by the Government of His
Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers,
in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people, it being
clearly understood that nothing should be done
which might prejudice the civil and religious
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine, or the rights and political status
enjoyed by Jews in any other country.15
21

C. THE CHURCHILL WHITE PAPER
Even before the Mandate was completed as a public document,
Arab reaction to the Balfour Declaration and the direction the
draft Mandate was taking prompted anti -Jewish disturbances and
Arab protests. Concerned with Arab reactions, Mr. Winston
Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies, issued a statement
of British policy concerning Palestine which was to be known as
the Churchill White Paper. The statement, issued on June 5,
1922, attempted to walk a tight line between Zionist aspirations
and Arab fears. The first part of the memorandum dealt with the
meaning of the wording of the Balfour Declaration and rumors that
the Zionists planned to create a Jewish state in Palestine. In
addition, it addressed the content of the draft Mandate particu-
larly the relationship between the Mandate Government and the
Jewish Agency.
The Palestinian Arabs were justifiably concerned that while
the Jewish Agency was specifically mentioned in the Mandate,
there was only a vague reference to the non- Jewish population
and no provision which specifically identified that population
and its interaction with the mandatory Government. Secretary
Churchill assured the Arab Delegation, which had visited London
concerning these fears, that they were unsubstantiated. He
went on to identify the Jewish Agency as not a member of the
Government with any specific powers but merely an organization
to provide an interface between the Jewish population in
Palestine and the Mandatory Government. In addition, he identi-
fied the fact that a Jewish National Home merely meant a home
22

"in Palestine" not a Jewish State. He even went so far as to
quote the Zionist Congress and its resolution in September
of the previous year to live in "unity and mutual respect"
with the Arabs in Palestine, and create a thriving, growing
community responsive to the national development goals of both.
Having addressed what he considered to be unfounded Arab
fears about the meaning of the Balfour Declaration and the
draft Mandate, Secretary Churchill went on to assure the Zionists
that this statement in no way altered the intentions of his
Majesty's Government concerning the policy of the Balfour
Declaration. In so doing he addressed the need to provide
protection for the Jewish community in Palestine as a religious
and cultural home for Jews of the world and states that immigra-
tion was a necessary method of ensuring that this community
would grow and remain healthy. The oft repeated phrase of
"immigration not to exceed the economic capacity of the country"
was used here to ensure that a policy of Jewish immigration
would continue as part of the Mandate but also to assure the
Arab community that they would not suffer economically as a
result of this immigration. In this regard, Churchill also
promised that when immigration numbers and policy became an
issue between the different communities in Palestine, the
Mandatory Government through the British Government would bring
the issue before the League of Nations.
Finally, the statement addressed the Arab's demand for
compliance with the McMahan-Hussein letter of October 24, 1915,
in which the British High Commissioner in Egypt promised King
Hussein an independent Arab nation upon the successful conclusion
23

of the First World War. The statement made it clear that
Palestine was not part of that agreement and that while this
was a verifiable fact, the British Government intended to aid
Palestine in establishing a fully independent government but
that this had to be accomplished in stages in cooperation with
the Mandatory Government and a Legislative Council.
The problems addressed in the Churchill White Paper con-
tinued to crop up time and again and yet the British 's attempts
to address them appeared disjointed and at cross purposes.
The importance of this document was that it represented the
earlier attempts immediately after the Balfour Declaration to
deal with a workable interpretation of that document which would
encourage both Arabs and Jews alike that both people could live
harmoniously in Palestine.
In this document as in the report of the King-Crane Commis-
sion mentioned earlier, one can see the growing Arab resentment
toward the British handling of problems between Arabs and Zionists
in Palestine. One can also see in the wording of the document
that the Zionist lobby in London had a much stronger influence
1 7in the British Government than did the Arab lobby. While
Churchill addressed Arab concerns, he was more explicit in
spelling out the policy which the British would follow regarding
the Jews. From the Balfour Declaration to the actual Mandate,
the vagueness of the Declaration changed considerably. In fact,
as Professor Khouri indicates in his book, The Arab-Israeli
Dilemma
,
the transition from the vague policy statement of the
Balfour Declaration to the binding pledge of the internationally
24

orecognized Palestine Mandate provided strength and specific
purpose to Zionist claims.
Initially the Balfour Declaration was only a
vaguely worded promise made in a letter to
Lord Rothschild. However, when the Palestine
Mandate Agreement between Britain and the League
of Nations was signed with the Balfour Declara-
tion incorporated into it, the Zionists acquired
their first internationally binding pledge of
support; consequently, their political claims to
Palestine were greatly strengthened. In fact the
mandatory agreement was framed largely in the
interest of the Jews. For example, it provided
for (1) the incorporation of the whole of the
Balfour Declaration; (2) the recognition of the
"historical connection of the Jewish people with
Palestine;" (3) the establishment of a Jewish
agency to be "recognized as a public body for
the purpose of advising and cooperating with the
Administration of Palestine in such economic,
social, and other matters as may affect the
establishment of the Jewish population in
Palestine;" (4) the facilitation of Jewish immi-
gration and the "close settlement by Jews on the
land," provided that the mandatory insures "that
the rights and position of other sections of the
population are not prejudiced;" (5) the right of
each community to maintain its own schools; and
(6) the use of Hebrew, as well as Arabic and
English, as official languages."-'- 8
Thus, documents such as the Churchill White Paper attempted to
ameliorate Arab distrust of British intentions without incurring
Zionist wrath over seeming British deviation from the promises
initiated with the Balfour Declaration. Even so, neither side
was satisfied with the White Paper and Zionists actually
maintained that it was a step backwards from the promises of the
Balfour Declaration.
D. PALESTINE FROM 1922 TO 1951
The period from 1922 until the outbreak of World War II saw
an increasing level of violent activity between the Jewish and
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Arab communities in Palestine and British efforts to administer
the Mandate and reconcile both sides became progressively
inept. Whenever trouble erupted in Palestine, the British
government reacted by sending a royal commission to investigate
the problem and provide recommendations for a peaceful solution.
In each case, these commissions were able to provide a signifi-
cantly detailed description of the problems and recommend
seemingly perceptive solutions and in each case the colonial
office issued statements of policy which angered both sides
and served merely to enflame the issue. Furthermore, the
Mandatory Government appeared particularly inept in implementing
that policy thus exacerbating the conflict without arriving at
a solution which would remotely please either side. This was
the case in the Shaw and Hope-Simpson Royal Commissions which
were sent to Palestine in 1929 and 1930 respectively as a
result of violent clashes between Arabs and Jews.
The Shaw and the Hope-Simpson Commissions identified the
basic Arab complaints which revolved around three issues.
First, the policy of Jewish immigration coupled with land
purchases created an atmosphere in which the Arabs saw
themselves as slowly being removed from their own country and
being made a minority in the process. Second, the Arabs
feared the economic domination of the Jews, many of whom
were better educated and more wealthy than the indigeneous
Arab population. In addition, the Zionist policy of excluding
Jewish lands from being sold to Arabs as well as discriminatory
hiring practices contributed to Arab resentment. Finally,
the Arab community felt that whenever the issues were brought
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to London, the British Government showed a marked sensitivity
to Jewish pressure and little inclination to produce anything
19
more than lip service to Arab requests. The reports which
emanated from these two Royal Commissions produced a new
policy statement in London called the British White Paper of
1930 or the Passfield White Paper.
The Passfield White Paper (1930) was the first serious
attempt to address Arab problems in Palestine in that it
attempted to solve the problems uncovered by the Commissions
instead of merely placating the Arabs with vague assurances.
It divided the problem into three areas and made detailed
descriptions of these problems and proposed solutions. The
three problem areas were security, constitutional development,
and economic and social development.
In addressing the security problem, this paperwas quite
concise stating that the Mandatory Government would ensure the
peace and would provide the necessary force level to accomplish
that task.
Concerning constitutional development, the paper chided the
Arab community for its adamant position of noncooperation and
reiterated the Mandatory Government's intention to set up a
Legislative Council to effect progress toward Palestinian
self- government
.
Finally, in the area of economic and social development
the Passfield White Paper further subdivided this problem area
by land, agr iculatural development and immigration. The most
telling part of this document addressed the incompatibility of
certain Zionist policies with the terms of the Mandate. In
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addition to stating that there was little or no cultivated
land remaining to be purchased by Jewish organizations and
that further attempt by Jewish agencies to purchase land
would dispossess the indigenious Arabs, it specifically iden-
tified the constitution of the Jewish Agency as incompatible
with the requirements of cooperation and fair treatment set
forth in the Mandate.
19. Moreover, the effect of Jewish colonization on
the existing population is very intimately affected
by conditions on which the various Jewish bodies
hold, utilize and lease their land....
These stringent provisions are difficult to recon-
cile with the declaration at the Zionist Congress
of 1921 of "the desire of the Jewish people to live
with the Arab people in relations of friendship and
mutual respect, and, together, with the Arab people,
to develop the homeland common to both into a pros-
perous community which would ensure the growth of
the peoples ....
However logical such arguments (Jewish Agency justi-
fication) may be from the point of view of a purely
national movement, it must, nevertheless, be pointed
out that they take no account of the provisions of
Article 6 of the Mandate, which expressly requires
that, in facilitating Jewish immigration and close
settlement by Jews on the land, the Administration
of Palestine must ensure that "the rights and posi-




In addition, the White Paper stated that in order to
improve agricultural development further land transactions
and development would come under the Palestinian Administration
Finally, the problem of unemployment in both the Jewish and
Arab communities appeared to be directly related to unrestric-
ted Jewish immigration and, in view of the fact that this
unemployment problem indicated that the economic absorbative
28

capacity of the country had been temporarily exceeded, no
further immigration certificates would be issued until the
21
situation began to sort itself out.
Needless to say, this document created an outcry in the
Zionist organization and the resultant pressure in London
forced the Prime Minister, James Ramsey MacDonald, to write
a letter to Dr. Chaim Weizmann explaining the British Govern-
ment's position. In this letter, the Prime Minister took
pains to point out that the Passfield White Paper was not
inconsistent with the requirements of the Mandate and that
the Mandatory Government was acting within its authority. By
stating that "His Majesty's Government did not prescribe and
do not contemplate any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish
"99
immigration in any of its categories, "" Prime Minister
MacDonald attempted to mitigate the effects of the statement
in the Passfield White Paper concerning the suspension of
immigration, which stated: "It may here be remarked that
in the light of the examination to which immigration and un-
employment problems have been subjected, His Majesty's
Government regard their action in the suspension of immigration
under the Labor Schedule last May as fully justified.""
Clearly the Prime Minister, under extreme pressure from
the Zionist lobby in London, was trying to placate both sides
and, in fact, satisfied neither. This attitude of vascillation
concerning the British administration of the Palestinian Mandate
was to create more problems than it attempted to solve.
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E. PALESTINE FROM 19 31 TO WORLD WAR II
Between 1931 and 1939 Arab fears of Zionist intentions
greatly increased largely due to increased immigration
patterns which were brought about as a result of Hitler's
systematic persecution of Jews in Europe.
The Arab majority opposed the steady influx of
Jewish immigrants but did not react severely while
their average annual number was below 10,000
persons. They became alarmed and provoked, how-
ever, during the early years of Nazi rule in
Germany, when the numbers rose to 30,000 in 1933,
42,000 in 1934 and more than 62,000 in 1935. It
was estimated that if this rate of immigration
continued, the Jews would become the majoritv bv
1947.24
Until 1936, the Arab majority in Palestine had proven to
be politically inept for a variety of reasons. However, their
primary inequality was due largely to their lack of higher
education, technical expertise, wealth and political sophisti-
cation as compared to their Jewish counterparts who were, for
the most part, new immigrants from the more advanced European
nations. Furthermore, the Turkish millet system had created
a socio-political structure which emphasized the differences
among the indigeneous population and therefore, created a long
tradition of e thno-religious separateness . Thus, the Arab
Palestinians, often unable to unite in any concerted effort
for an appreciable length of time, proved to be their own
worst enemy.
It was not until 1936, primarily in response to rapidly
increasing Jewish immigration, that the various Arab Factions
joined to form the Supreme Arab Committee which later became
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the Arab Higher Committee. This organization called a general
strike of Arabs in Palestine and began a campaign of terror
and guerrilla warfare. This period of fighting between Arabs
and Jews, often referred to as the Arab Rebellion, was the
primary impetus for the next Royal commission to investigate
the rioting, the Peel Commission which arrived in late 1936
and departed in the Winter of 1937. In the meantime the
fighting was bitter and well organized. The Jewish community,
more well -prepared than during the 1929 riots, protected
itself with a well-trained defense force, the Haganah. At
the same time, the Arab community, for the first time, had
the combined support of its neighboring Arab leaders.
The Peel Commission, in its report to the British Govern-
ment, confirmed the Shaw and Hope-Simpson Commissions, in
repeating that the source of the Arab Palestinian grievances
was predominantly the fears that Jewish immigration and land
purchases were driving the indigeneous Arab population into
2 5
a minority situation if not out of the land. However, the
Peel Commission went a good distance farther in declaring
that these differences were irreconcilable and recommending
partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states as the
best solution. The Twentieth Zionist Congress meeting in
August-September, 1937, rejected the Peel Commission Report
and blamed the Palestine Administration for the difficulties
between Arabs and Jews. However, it did empower the Executive
to negotiate with the British Government concerning the
establishment of a Jewish state.
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Arab resistance continued and the Government took strong
measures to curtail Arab activity including arrest and depor-
tation of many of the Arab leaders. Though unified for the
first time, this Arab Palestinian nationalist movement soon
found itself leaderless and despondent, having been success-
27fully crushed by British countermeasures . It was during
this time that His Majesty's Government dispatched another
commission to provide a more thorough investigation of the
possibility of partition as a solution to the problems in
Palestine. In February and March, 1939, the British Govern-
ment, in an attempt to bring the opposing sides together
chaired a conference which was composed of American, British
and European leaders as well as Zionists and Palestinians.
However, not only were there difficulties in obtaining spokes-
men for the Palestinian contingent since many of their leaders
were jailed or in exile but the Palestinian delegates refused
to sit in the same room \vith the Zionists. In any case,
neither side would concede and the London Conference was
28
stillborn.
In May 17, 1939, the British Government issues a new
Palestine Policy Statement referred to as the MacDonald White
Paper. In this statement, His Majesty's Government acquiesced
to a number of Arab demands concerning future self-government
and Jewish immigration and land sales. Specifically, the
government rejected the idea of partition as unworkable and
•stated its goal of an independent Palestine within ten years
linked to Great Britain through treaties. Furthermore, the
government limited Jewish immigration to 75,000 over the
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following five years after which no further Jewish immigration
will be allowed without Arab approval. Finally, the statement
declared a policy of restricting land sales to Jews in some
29
areas, and prohibiting the sale of land in other areas.
Quite naturally, the Zionists vilified the British
Government and the White Paper alienated the entire Jewish
community and produced terrorist activity by Jewish militant
30groups
.
F. PALESTINE FROM WWII TO THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL
When war broke out in Europe in 1939, the Arabs and Jews
were unreconciled but an informal truce was observed by all
sides. The British tried to enforce the White Paper policy
but the terrors of the holocaust greatly increased illegal
immigration to such a degree that it more than equaled the
legal quotas. At the same time, even opposed to British
policy as they were, the Zionists were forced into the allied
camp by Hitler's excesses. Dr. Weizmann continually pressured
the British to allow the Zionist to form a Jewish brigade but
until 1944 His Majesty's overnment would allow Jews to be
inducted into the British Army but not fight as separate units
Nevertheless, Palestinian Jews enlisted in large numbers.
Equally, their Arab counterparts were less inclined to extend
their truce to such a degree, inasmuch as their principle
leader, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem al-Haj Muhammad Amin al-
Husseini, forced to flee Palestine by the British during the
Arab Rebellion,, arrived in Germany in the beginning of the war

32pledging to end British imperialism. However, two extrem-
ist Jewish groups the Stern Gang and Irgun Zvai Leumi contin-
ued harrassing terrorism against the Mandatory Government to a
limited degree. By 1944 the Middle East was no longer under
serious threat from the Axis powers and both sides began to
prepare for the resumption of hostilities that the end of
the war would inevitably bring. The Irgun and Stern Gang
stepped up their terror of both the British Mandatory Govern-
ment and the Arab community in Palestine.
During the war in 1942 the American Zionist Organization
drafted a declaration at New York in the Biltmore Hotel which
was ultimately adopted by the World Zionist Organization.
Known as the Biltmore Program, it began by repudiating the
White Paper of 1939 and called for increased Jewish immigra-
tion controlled by the Jewish Agency, the formation of a Jewish
state and a Jewish Army. " This document was to be the basis
for future Zionist activity in Palestine. The Biltmore Program
coupled with the urgency of solving the problem of displaced
persons, largely European Jews, in post-war Europe gave renewed
vigor to Zionist ambitions and Jewish guerrilla activity
increased against the British. Interestingly enough, American
immigration policies at this time contributed significantly to
the problem. President Truman was unwilling to revise the
immigration quotas upward to relieve this pressure in Europe
and David Ben-Gurion, the leader of the Jewish Agency, favored
the President's policy since he was vitally concerned with
increasing the Jewish population in Palestine. The United
States was, by far, the first choice of most European refugees
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and this restrictive policy made Palestine the only other
logical choice for displaced Jews.
Between October and December, 1945, a devastating series
of guerrilla raids on British forces and communications
facilities, coordinated between the Palmah (Haganah commandos
the Irgun, led by Manahem Begin, and the Stern Gang, led by
Nathan Friedman-Yellin, demonstrated the Zionist's determina-
tion to have their way in Palestine and the cost to the British
Government, already suffering from the ravages of World War II.
Arab pressure against Jewish immigration on the one hand
and American insistence on a solution acceptable to Zionists
on the other forced the British to request an Anglo-American
Committee of Inquiry in an attempt to remedy a steadily deterio-
rating situation in Palestine. This committee met in London in
1946 and delivered ten recommendations which inter alia called
for the issuance of 100,000 certificates of immigration for
displaced Jews, stated that the concept of a partitioned Palestine
was unworkable, that the Mandate be continued under U.N. Trusteeship
and the current land sale policy be rescinded in favor of a free
market policy without regard for race, community or creed.
Increased violence in Palestine and Arab solidarity against
these recommendations forced the Committee to propose a parti-
tion plan called the Morrison- Grady Plan. This was rejected
by both sides but the Jewish Agency re-wrote the plan in an
effort to gain acceptance of a Jewish state satisfactory to
their needs. This plan, as all partition plans, proved unac-
ceptable to the Arab leaders and as violence continued, the
British, in desperation turned to the United Nations.
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Foreign Minister Bevin indicated that Great Britain would
follow any decision reached by the United Nations and indicated
that the British Government would soon give up the mandate.
The United Nations General Assembly organized the United
Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to investigate
the problems and make recommendations. After visiting Palestine
in the Summer of 1947 and witnessing numerous acts of violence
and terrorism, largely by Jews against the British, UNSCOP
returned to Geneva to draft its decisions. The Special Committee
drew up two partition plans known as the Majority Plan and the
Minority Plan.
The Majority Plan called for separate Jewish and Arab
states with an economic union and an internationally supervised
area of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The Minority Plan proposed
a single federated state divided into autonomous Jewish and
Arab cantons. The Zionists favored the Majority Plan because
it gave them an independent Jewish State while the Arabs opted
for the Minority Plan since it would create a single state in
which they would be the predominant influence in view of their
larger population base. In November 1947 the two plans were
brought before the General Assembly for a vote. After signifi-
cant debate and pressure exerted on all sides the Majority Plan
38
was finally adopted.
Soon after the Partition Plan of 1947 was adopted and the
British Government was directed to implement it, serious
fighting broke out. By early 1948, the fighting had escalated
to full scale civil war and Haganah Irgun and Stern Gang acti-
vities against both Arabs and British reached frightening
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proportions. By February 1948, it was rapidly becoming obvious
that the levels of fighting were becoming a serious problem for
British morale. At home, citizens began to clamour for the
army to pull out and atrocities built upon atrocities. Typical
of the excesses of the Jewish extremist Irgun was the massacre
of 250 men, women and children in the Arab town of Deir Yassim
as a means of frightening the Palestinian Arabs into fleeing
the country.
As early as February, 1947, the U.S. government recognized
that the antagonism between Arabs and Jews, fostered by years
of bitter fighting, would not allow the Partition Plan to
succeed. Coupled with the fact that in mid-December, 1947, the
British Government had announced its intention to pull out of
Palestine by May 14, 1948, the American Ambassador to the U.N.
proposed a U.N. trusteeship to oversee Palestine until a viable
solution could be reached. The Jewish Agency decried this
proposal as a "shocking reversal" of U.S. policy and even U.N.
delegates supporting the Majority Plan on behalf of the U.S.
were surprised.
While the debate raged in Lake Success, N.Y., the fighting
intensified to full scale war in Palestine and by May, 1948,
over 150,000 Arab Palestinians had fled the area. As they
had declared earlier, the British pulled out of Palestine on
May 14th and at the same time the Provisional Government of
Israel led by David Ben-Gurion declared the establishment of
41
the State of Israel. Within minutes President Truman gave
de facto recognition of the new state and thereby destroyed
his own delegation's support at the U.N. which was close to
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establishing a U.N. trusteeship in Palestine. Furthermore,
he severely weakened the U.S. delegation's position in the
U.N. vis a vis other friendly nations.
. . .We said that it was our best estimate that the
recognition of the provisional government of Israel
last Friday evening had deeply undermined the confi-
dence of other delegations in our integrity and the
Department should keep that fact in mind. A large
number of delegations believed that recognition
constituted a reversal of United States policy for
truce plus trusteeship as urged in the special
session and, in later stages, our compromise plan
for truce plus mediation. In our previous efforts
to secure a truce both in the Security Council and
in formal negotiations, the U.S. delegations had
heavily emphasized that there should be no action
of a political character that would alter the
status quo or prejudice the rights, the claims, or
the position of Arabs or Jews. This position of
ours was generally understood to apply primarily
to the establishment of the Jewish state. 42
The political nature of President Truman's posture is
clearly evident in Ellis' book, The Dilemma of Israel :
President Truman asked for the diplomats' (Ameri-
can diplomats stationed in the Middle East) views
on the effects of American policy in Palestine.
The substance of what the diplomats said was that
American relations with the Arabs would be gravely
jeopardized by on-sided partiality to the Zionists.
"Mr. Truman, 'wrote Colonel Eddy,' summed up his
position with the utmost candor: 'I'm sorry,
gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of
thousands who are anxious for the success of
Zionism: I do not have hundred of thousands of
Arabs among my constituents .' "43
Having thus lost any hope of support for the proposal of
a U.N. Trusteeship with an international police force, the
U.S. delegation continued to extol the need for a truce and
a U.N. mediator and Count Folke Bernadotte was appointed to
that position on May 20, 1948. 44

In the meantime, intense fighting continued in Palestine
and initially the military situation for Israel appeared grim
especially on the eastern area where the Arab Legion had
pushed within ten miles of the Mediterranean Sea threatening
to cut the new state in two. A U.N. negotiated ceasefire
scheduled to last for four weeks gave both sides breathing
time but worked to Israel's advantage and against the Arabs.
While Israel increase in military strength (in violation of
the cease-fire) and political coordination, the Arab side's
political front deteriorated as a result of contending views
of King Abdullah of the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan and
the Mufti.
Count Bernadote's proposals for a peaceful settlement met
with sharp disagreement from the Zionist and Arab camps even
though the major powers were able to reach a limited agreement
in the U.N. The major striking point in the Arab world was
the proposed annexation of Arab Palestine by Transjordan.
King Abdullah favored this idea while the other Arab state
wanted an independent Palestine. (In 1950, when the issue
had quieted down somewhat, King Abdullah annexed the West
Bank)
. The Zionists, on the other hand, claimed that the
45partition proposal did not leave them with enough land.
Fighting broke out again at the end of the truce period
but a second truce was quickly negotiated, however, violations
continued as the Israelis became disenchanted with U.N. activi
'ties and decided that the only way to ensure U.N. recognition
46
was to provide the world with a fait accompli.
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On September 17, Count Bernadotte was assassinated in
Jerusalem by a member of the Stern Gang and the situation
gradually degenerated into full scale fighting by mid October.
Dr. Ralph Bunche was replaced as U.N. negotiator. Fighting
continued with a marked change in the military situation as
a result of the Zionist's recruitment and re-armament efforts
during the truce. By January 1949, Egypt was suffering signifi-
cant defeats at the hands of the Israelis and decided for a
variety of reasons to enter into armistice negotiations. The
other confrontation states realizing the futility of carrying
on without Egypt soon entered into separate armistice negotia-
tions with Israel and by April 13 a permanent ceasefire was in
effect
.
In the meantime, Israel was greatly interested in achieving
membership in the U.N. as a means of obtaining international
recognition as a sovereign state within the family of nations.
Philip Jessup takes pains to point out this fact in his book,
The Birth of Nations .
The question of recognition and eventually of ad-
mission to membership in the United Nations was
considered very important by the new State of
Israel ."48
At the end of April 1949, Israel had significantly expanded
her borders beyond those set forth in the Partition Plan of
1947. From 1949 on, hostilities between the Arab nations and
Israel continued with another major war breaking out in 1956.
However, nothing changed the face of the state of Israel as
much as the June 1967 war which not only substantially increased
the amount of territory in Israeli hands but, due to the apparent
ease of victory, devastated the Arab self-image.
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G. ARAB- ISRAELI WAR OF JUNE 196 7
Through March and April of 1967, border tensions between
Israel and Syria increased with both sides claiming border
violations. The fighting excalated and on April 7, Israel
claimed to have downed six Syrian Migs while Syria claimed
to destroy five Israeli aircraft. Raids continued across
the northern and western borders of Israel by fadayeen
guerrillas and Israeli retaliatory strikes, while under-
standable, were far more severe and merely exacerbated the
situation. By May 15, the UAR had put its forces on alert
and Arab news agencies, by their reporting, forced the con-
frontation states into more militant action. For example,
on the same day, the Syrian Arab News Agency reported that
Israel and Jordan border guards and intelligence officers had
an agreement of "hot pursuit" in which either side would
penetrate the other's borders for up to three kilometers
while chasing fadayeen guerrillas. Whether true or not at
the time, it certainly put Jordan on the defensive within
the Arab states. By May 17, the stage within the Arab
World was set. The UAR requested that all U.N. Emergency
Forces be evacuated and Syria and Jordan announced that all
forces were on full alert. On May 20, the Arab League
Council announced full Arab unity; an attack on any Arab
state would be considered an attack on all Arab states. Thus,
all that remained for war was an incident which Egypt provided
by occupying Sharm el-Shaykh and closing the Gulf of Aqaba t




All attempts by U.N. and United States officials to ease
49tensions were to no avail. By June 5, the inevitable
happened. Israel, under increasing military pressure from all
sides, launched a preemptive air attack which devastated the
Egyptian Air Force. Within hours massive ground forces were
engaged on all fronts. By June 8, Egypt accepted the U.N.'s
call for a cease fire and on June 9, Syria also agreed. By
June 11, almost all of the hostilities had ended and Israel
now found itself occupying land almost four times the size of
its original borders. Suddenly Israel's control extended
from the Suez Canal to the Jordan River and north to the
Golan Heights
.
After the initial flush of victory wore off, Israel settled
down to some serious problems. With the increase of its borders
came the concommitant problem of dealing with the Arab occupants,
over one million people hostile to the occupying power. Thus,
while the external security threat had been neutralized, albeit
temporarily, the internal security threat increased with the
border shift and sudden population growth. In addition, on
November 22, the U.N. Security Council adopted U.N. Resolution
242 calling for Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories
as a pre-requisite for peace in the embattled area. This reso-
lution was accepted by the vast majority of U.N. members thus
applying significant international pressure for Israel to return
to its pre-war borders. As time wore on, this resoltuion had




Numerous events in the Arab World such as the rise of
Nasir in Egypt and his subsequent death in 1970, the fall
of the Hashimite Kingdom in Iraq in 1959, the Czech Arms
deal with Egypt in 1956 and the bergoning influence of the
Soviet Union in Syria, Iraq and Egypt, the switch in Egyptian
foreign policy from Soviet influence to closer U.S. ties
under President Sadat and the October 1973 War have all had
significant influence in the domestic and foreign policies
of Israel. However, the situation on the ground has changed
little since June, 1967. Yet, the single most important
event in recent times has been Egyptian President Sadat's
visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. This face to face
meeting between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin,
while vilified within the Arab World, has created the first
real hope for peace in the Middle East in the last three
decades. The subsequent talks initiated by President Carter
at Camp David, Maryland, between Sadat and Begin have been
both a source of hope and fear. While the issues between
Egypt and Israel over the Sinai appear relatively easy to
resolve the question of a Palestinian homeland on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip is proving to be particularly diffi-
cult. However, the fact that these discussions are taking
place indicated that for the first time since Palestine was
separated from the Ottoman Empire the concept of a separate




II. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF SELECTED DOCUMENTS IN THE
PALESTINIAN SITUATION
A. FROM BALFOUR DECLARATION TO LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATE
Having provided a brief background of some of the more
salient legal documents dealing with Palestine in their his-
torical context, this chapter will now analyze the legal
implications of these documents operating from the basic
assumption that a Palestinian state exists. In so doing,
the more pertinent questions such as the state's right to
exist, the derivation of its sovereignty, the limits of its
sovereignty and related questions concerning citizenship and
ability to enter into international agreements will be
addressed
.
In dealing with the first document, the Balfour Declaration
of November 2, 1917, which recognized Zionist interests in
Palestine, there is little disagreement with the contention
that it is not a legal paper designed to give the Jews sover-
eign title to any part or all of Palestine. It is merely a
statement by the British Government of its intention to
support the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
There is nothing within the text of that statement which
indicates or obligates Great Britain to follow a particular
course of action or, for that matter, to do anything other
than provide moral support. To quote Nathan Feinberg in his
essay, "Sovereignty Over Palestine:"
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...The Balfour Declaration was never intended to
determine the fate and future of Palestine. All
that that document provided was that His Majesty's
Government view with favor the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people
and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the
achievement of this ob j ect ... There was nothing at
all wrong in giving such a promise. It was no more
an infringement of international law than giving
promises to the Arabs and other nations during the
War. 51
However, one item seems to be continually overlooked and
that is the fact that in this document the British actually
made several promises of an important nature. Not only did
His Majesty's Government promise to facilitate the establish-
ment of a national home for Jewish people in Palestine, but
it also promised that in so doing it would not "prejudice the
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities
5 2in Palestine...." " This is a key promise inasmuch as there
is a question of execution under such circumstances.
As indicated in Chapter I of this paper, the farmers of
the Balfour Declaration recognized that in making such a
declaration they were walking a fine line between Zionist
hopes and Arab aspirations for an independent state. Thus,
the "safeguard clause" concerning the rights of non-Jews in
Palestine was deemed necessary and perhaps, therein lies the
basic difficulty. While the promise to support Zionist goals
in Palestine is extremely vague in that nothing definitive is
set down on paper in that declaration, the promise to refrain
from prejudicing the rights of non-Jews is much sharper. By
the time the British Government wrote the Balfour Declaration
it had es tablished a very clear idea of what constituted
human rights. Therefore, any attempt to claim that this
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safeguard clause is as vague as the promise to assist Zionist
is not founded in legal reality. Oppenheim's International Law
,
Vol. I, states the case quite clearly:
. ..(T)he various treaties - such as those concluded
at the Berlin Conference in 1878 or on the termina-
tion of the First World War - for the protection of
religious and linguistic minorities signified the
tendency to extend recognition, by means of inter-
national supervision and enforcement, to the
elementary rights of at least some sections of the
population of the State. 53
It further states that:
Since the Virginian Declaration of Rights of 1776,
the American Declaration of Independence and the
Bill of Rights in the form of the first ten Amend-
ments to the Constitution, and the Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen adopted in 1789
by the French National Assembly, the express recog-
nition and the special protection of fundamental
rights of man in the constitutions of various States
have become a general principle of the constitutional
law of civilized States. In Great Britain, where
the system of a written constitution superior to the
ordinary law of the land is unknown, the same result
was achieved in a different way. b ^
The author goes on to point out that the British tradition
of rights of the individual began with the Magna Charta in
1215 and continued with the Petition of Right in 1628 and
the Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement in 1689. It would
appear that the British Government had a reasonably clear and
definitive idea of what was promised in safeguarding the civil
and religious rights of non-Jews in Palestine.
Since this was the case at the time of the Balfour Declara-
tion, it would seem that the options available to the British
Government in assisting the Zionist Organization in establish-
ing a national home for Jews in Palestine were limited by the
safeguard clause and not the other way around.
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However, as stated earlier, the Balfour Declaration was
merely a policy statement and not necessarily a legal docu-
ment in the sense that it bound the British Government to
perform certain acts on behalf of the Zionist Organization.
While there are several theories concerning the binding power
of declarations, O'Connell in his book, International Law
,
states that two tests may be used to determine the legal
commitment of a declaration. The first is the precision of
language used and the second is the power of the negotiators
to commit their countries to a stated purpose. Oppenheim
is more firm when he states that "(a) mere general statement
of policy and principles cannot be regarded as intended to
give rise to a contractual obligation in the strict sense of
the word."
Applying the above tests to the Balfour Declaration would
seem to indicate that its vagueness negates any support for
it as a legally binding document. Yet, it was vitally impor-
tant to the Zionists in that, first, it gave formal recognition
to the goals of that organization and second, it was incorpora-
ted into the wording of the Palestine Mandate and this did
have a significant legal effect. Furthermore, it was also the
basis for several other declarations in favor of a policy
supporting a Jewish homeland in Palestine and finally it was
incorporated into the preamble of the Palestine Order in
Council of August 10, 1922, establishing the structure of the
Mandatory Government. Thus, the British Government could not
be legally required to comply with a mere policy statement,




Council of August 10, 1922, are two documents which impose
much more stringent legal obligations.
The fact that the Palestinian Mandate is a law-making treaty
is difficult to discredit. Again Oppenheim points out the
distinction of treaties and their import.
...(T)here is one distinction to be made which, though
theoretically faulty, is of practical importance, and
according to which the whole body of treaties is to be
divided into two classes. In one class are treaties
concluded for the purpose of laying down general rules
of conduct among a considerable number of states.
Treaties of this kind may be termed law-making
treaties . . . "
In the "South West Africa Cases" the International Court of
Justice reaffirmed this position in its finding.
...(As to the objection that the Mandate had never
been or was, since the dissolution of the League,
no longer a treaty in force, the Court points out
that) for its conformation, the Mandate for South
West Africa took the form of a resolution of the
Council of the League but...(i)t cannot be cor-
rectly regarded as embodying only an executive
action in pursuance of the Covenant. The Mandate,
in fact and in law, is an international agreement
having the character of a treaty or convention.
The Preamble of the Mandate itself shows this
character . 5
8
The Court also stated:
The first-mentioned group of obligations are
defined in Article 22... and in Articles 2-5 of the
Mandate. The Union (of South Africa) undertook
the general obligation to promote to the utmost
the material and moral well-being and the social
progress of the inhabitants...
These obligations represent the very essence of the
sacred trust of civilization. Their reason d'etre
and original' object remain. Since their fulfill-
ment did not depend on the existence to the League
of Nations, they could not be brought to an end
merely because their supervisory organ ceased to
exist. Nor could the right of the population to
have the Territory administered in accordance with
there rules depend thereon. 59
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Thus one can see that the transition from a mere declara-
tory policy to a law-making treaty was an enormous and far
reaching step for the Zionist cause in Palestine. By accept-
ing the Mandate for Palestine the British Government was now
responsible by law to submit to the supervision of the
Council of the League in administering the Mandate. Further-
more, this obligation did not end, as stated in the South West
Africa Cases, with the dissolution of the League of Nations.
The duties of the Mandate continued to bind His Majesty's
Government and the supervisory role was adopted by the
United Nations.
The obligation incumbent upon a mandatory State to
accept international supervision and to submit
reports is an important part of the Mandates System.
When the authors of the Covenant created this
system, they considered that the effective perform-
ance of the sacred trust of civilization by the
mandatory powers required that the administration
of mandated territories should be subject to inter-
national supervision. The authors of the Charter
had in mind the same necessity when they organized
an International Trusteeship System. The necessity
for supervision continues to exist despite the dis-
appearance of the supervisory organ under the
Mandates System. It cannot be admitted that the
obligation to submit to supervision has disappeared
merely because the supervisory organ has ceased to
exist, when the United Nations has another inter-
national organ performing similar, though not
identical supervisory functions.
Those general considerations are confirmed by
Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Charter, as this
clause has been interpreted above. It purports
to safeguard, not only the rights of States, but
also the rights of the peoples of mandated terri-
tories until Trusteeship Agreements are concluded...
The competence of the General Assembly of the United
Nations to exercise such supervision and to receive
and examine reports is derived from the provisions
of Article 10 of the Charter, which authorizes the
General Assembly to discuss any questions or any
matters within the scope of the Charter and to make
recommendations on these questions or matters to the
members of the United Nations...

For the above reasons, the Court has arrived at
the conclusion that the General Assembly of the
United Nations is legally qualified to exercise
the supervisory functions previously exercised
by the League of Nations with regard to the
administration of the Territory ... .60
It then becomes clear that the Balfour Declaration as
incorporated into the Palestine Mandate became effectively
an instrument of international law and that the force of this
law continued through the dissolution of the League of Nations
and on into the Charter of the United Nations, and that the
British Government, as the mandatory power, was bound by the
articles of that mandate to comply with all the provisions set
forth in the mandate. The question then becomes: How well
did Great Britain, as the mandatory power, comply with the
provisions of the Mandate?
There is little doubt that at the end of World War I
President Wilson's ideas of peace and a new world order in
which aggressive colonialism was to be subplanted by the
concept of free peoples to determine their own national fate
was the cornerstone of the League of Nations. His famous
Fourteen Points Speech began the process of negotiations at
Paris to determine the fate of colonial territories.
The peace treaties concluded after the end of the
first World War were under the ideological impact
of Woodrow Wilson's 'principle of self-determination
of nations;' under this inspiration new states were
created, existing ones expanded and the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy dismembered.... 01
Furthermore, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations is clear in recognizing that:
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Certain communities formerly belonging to the
Turkish Empire have reached a stage of develop-
ment where their existence as independent nations
can be provisionally recognized subject to the
rendering of administrative advice and assistance
by a Mandatory until such time as they are able
to stand alone. The wishes of these communities
must be a principle consideration in the selection
of the Mandatory. ^
2
There is a substantial body of evidence that throughout
the period from 1922 until 1948 the British Government, as
the Mandatory power, ignored, in its various policies, the
desires of the indigeneous population. From the beginning
the major powers chose to disregard the findings of the King-
Crane Commission which stated that the results of its inter-
views indicated a marked preference for the selection of the
United States as a Mandatory power. In the ensuing years the
finding of the Shaw, Hope-Simpson Commissions, and the Peel
Commissions provided ample testimony to His Majesty's Govern-
ment that British policies concerning Jewish immigrations were
in direct contravention to the wishes of the Arab majority in
Palestine. In addition, the policy of the Jewish Agency
concerning the refusal to sell Jewish owned land to Arabs and
to hire Arab labourers also provided severe distress among the
Arab community. As stated earlier, it was not until the
issuance of the White Paper of 1939 that the British Government
began to pay serious attention to the needs and wishes of the
non-Jewish majority in Palestine.
Although hindsight has limited value in such cases it is
•unfortunate to note that it was possible through studious but
firm policy decisions based on these reports for the Mandatory
Government to comply with the spirit and letter of the Mandate,
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that is, to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish national
home in Palestine without prejudicing the rights of the Arab
Palestinians. Thus, the noted writer Isador F. Stone in his
book, Underground to Palestine
,
states:
Four years after the Balfour Declaration was pro-
mulgated, Ahad Ha Am (a Russian Jewish intellectual)
expanded his views on it in a preface to the Berlin
edition of his book, At the Cross Ways . He wrote
then that the historical right of the Jewish people
to a national home in Palestine 'does not invali-
date the right of the rest of the land's inhabi-
tants.' He recognized that they had 'a genuine
right to the land due to generations of residence
and work upon it.' For them too, Ahad Ha Am went
on, 'this country is a national home and they have
the right to develop their national potentialities
to the uttermost.' He felt that this 'makes
Palestine into a common possession of different
peoples . '
This is why, Ahad Ha Am explained, the British
Government 'promised to facilitate the establish-
ment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish
people and not, as was proposed to it, the recon-
struction of Palestine as the National Home for the
Jewish People.' Ahad Ha Am said the purpose of the
Balfour Declaration was two-fold: (1) to establish
a Jewish National Home there, but (2) also to deny
'any right to deprive the present inhabitants of
their rights' and any intention 'of making the
Jewish people the sole ruler of the country. 64
Thus, had the British government followed a consistent and
active policy of limiting immigration to those numbers which
thenation could economically support and prohibited the land
acquisition policies of the Jewish Agency, it is conceivable
that the mandate could have been followed to a successful
conclusion. However, what restraint the British did exhibit
was too little, too late and by 1948, the area was in total,
bloody chaos to the continued detriment of all parties.
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B. SOVEREIGNTY AND TITLE IN PALESTINE AND THE EFFECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION
Accepting Oppenheim's statement that certain treaties are
effectively international legislation and the decision of the
International Court of Justice that the oblitations of the
mandates remained in effect over in the absence of the League
of Nations and that the United Nations was competent to super-
vise these mandates, what then was the status of sovereignty in
Palestine and who held title to the land?
It is difficult to come to grips with a modern definition
of sovereignty. Professor Quincy Wright in his book,
Mandates Under the League of Nations
,
expressed this difficulty:
The world 'sovereignty' has been used... to mean
legal omnipotence except as limited by applica-
ble international law and treaties or, conversely,
freedom from limitation by municipal law. This
definition, however, may not correspond to con-
ceptions often implied by the term and may not be
sufficiently precise to assist in classifying the
diverse political structures of the day, particu-
larly in the mandated territories. •>
However, Wright further makes an important point between




...From the standpoint of municipal law, the claim
of a state through its organ with ultimate authority
in the matter to a legal right, power, or interest
is a legal right, power, or interest; but from the
sTandpoint of international law, such a claim is
valid only insofar as established through the
appropriate international procedure. "
The Digest of International Law supports this and adds the
definition of territorial sovereignty as quoted from Han Aufricht




The right of a state to function within a certain
territory, unimpeded by any interference from the
outside, is called territorial sovereignty...
The exclusive territorial jurisdiction of a state
is, or may be restricted with respect to certain
matters. Such limitations of territorial sover-
eignty are usually based upon customary interna-
tional or treaty law. 6?
This brings us to an important point about territorial
sovereignty and how it is acquired.
Although, as Oppenheim states, "No unaminity exists with
regard to the modes of acquiring territory on the part of the
international community.", there is a general principle in
international law which Wright states is akin to acquiring
title to real property. "As a rule only he who has title can
69give title," or the law of succession. However, both
Oppenheim and Jennings discuss five modes or procedures of
acquiring territorial sovereignty.
The books tell us there are five 'modes' by which
territorial sovereignty can be acquired: (1)
occupation , viz. of territory which is not under
the sovereignty of anyone; (2) prescription by
which title flows from an effective possession
over a period of time; (3) cession , or the transfer
of territory by a treaty provision; (4) accession
or accretion
,
where the shapes of land is changed
by the processes of nature; and finally (5), subju-
gation or^ if you prefer the older terminology,
conquest . •' ®
In discussing Palestine three modes of the five modes come
into play. However, Jennings refers to Oppenheim in adding a
sixth mode in which a new state comes into existence and that
is by "revolt." In the sense that both Arabs and Jews cooper-
ated with the Allied Powers in fighting the Ottoman Empire
the concept of revolt would apply to Palestine. However, in
analyzing the territorial sovereignty of Palestine, numerous
factors come into play.

In the first place, there is little argument with the
fact that Turkey enjoyed territorial sovereignty over
Palestine prior to World War I. By Article 16 of the Treaty
of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, Turkey renounced all title to
Palestine yet the question exists; did Turkey's sovereign
title cease to exist when she ratified the Treaty of
Lausanne or when she ceased to control the territory as
a result of military defeat? Quincy Wright argues for the
latter:
In the case of the mandates of Palestine and Syria,
there is merely the recital that the Principal
Allied Powers have agreed to intrust the territory
'which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire'
to the mandatory in accord with which Turkey lost
her sovereignty. The Treaty of Sevres by which
she renounced them was never ratified, and the
treaty of Lauanne by which she renounced them was
not made at the time the mandates were assigned.
It would thus appear that the transfer from Turkey
at the time the mandates were assigned could be
accounted for only on the principle of successful
revolution or completed conquest. The United
States argued for the latter.... '1
The next question follows then, assuming that by whatever
mode Turkey renounced title to the area, who, then, acquired
sovereign title? Again, Wright addresses this question:
Thus a study of the transfers indicates that for
all the mandated areas except Iraq title passed
from Germany to Turkey to the Principal Powers,
who, however, never had full sovereignty but
merely a transitional title of which they
divested themselves in transferring title to the
regime set up by the Covenant. '2
i&
In the case of Palestine the British Government was select
ed as the mandatory and it, in turn, established a Palestine
Administrative Government subject to the provisions of Article
22 and the Palestine Mandate. From this point Wright argues
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that the only legal means of changing the status of Palestine
was through an amendment to Article 22, without which the
Mandatory had no authority to alter the status of the area,
by admitting Palestine to membership in the League of Nations
as an equal partner or by recognizing the independence of the
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nation. In the case of the last two options the terms of
the mandate would have been fulfilled.
Sir Arnold McNair makes another point concerning sover-
eignty in his separate opinion with regard to the "International
Status of South-West Africa."
Upon sovereignty a very few world will suffice. The
Mandates System (and the 'corresponding principles'
of the International Trusteeship System) is a new
institution - a new relationships between territory
and its inhabitants on the one hand and the govern-
ment which represents them internationally on the
other - a new species of international government,
which does not fit into the old conception of sover-
eignty and which is alien to it. The doctrine of
sovereignty has no application to this new system.
Sovereignty over a Mandated Territory is in abeyance,
if and when the inhabitants of the Territory obtain
recognition as an independent State, as has already
happened in the case of some of the Mandates, sover-
eignty will revive and vest in the new State. '
^
Although Wright talks about a limited sovereignty governed
by the dictates of the Mandate System while McNair states that
sovereignty is held in abeyance during the existence of the
Mandate, both seem to agree that the inhabitants of the terri-
tory are the common factor and that the final determinant con-
cerning sovereignty is the emergence of an independent state.
In either case then it would seem that sovereignty ultimately
•resided within the inhabitants of Palestine from the time
Britain conquered the area with the help of the Palestinians
until she relinquished the mandate in 1948.
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This situation changed in May 14, 1948, when Israel
declared its independence. In so changing the status of
Palestine did Israel acquire legal title to that portion of
Palestine which she claimed as an independent state? Again
quoting from Wright in Mandates Under the League of Nations
the indications are that Israel did, in fact, acquire legal
title to her territory. It is important to note that Wright's
book was published in 1930 and yet seems to anticipate such
an eventuality.
. .
.Who is competent to recognize the achievement
of that evolution? (independence) Admission of
one of these communities to the League would imply
that it had become 'fully self governing' (covenant,
Art. I) and thus apparently beyond the stage con-
templated in Article 22. This has been recognized
in the case of Iraq. Such admission can be effected
by a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly. In inter-
national law, however, political claims may always
become legal rights through general recognition.
Thus, if one of these communities asserted that it
no longer needed tutelage and the states of the
world expressly recognized that claim, the status
of the community would seem to be legally changed.
Such a general recognition, however, is hardly con-
ceivable without formal action by the League.
There is finally the possibility of annexation or
other change of status of an area by the mandatory,
conquest by some other power or revolution, and
ousting of the mandatory by the inhabitants, any of
which would be in violation of Article 22. Such
violent changes might acquire de jure character
through subsequent general recognition or long
acquiescence in the changed situation.... '5
The importance of this statement can be seen in light of
later developments. On May 11, 1949, Israel, as it existed
at that time, was admitted as a full member of the United
Nations, thus, conferring recognition by that international
body. The fact that Wright refers to the League of Nations
would seem to be of little consequence as the later decision
of the International Court of Justice concerning the South
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West Africa Cases declared the United Nations competent to
act in lieu of the dissolved League. Furthermore, Article 77
of the Charter specifically encompasses the mandated terri-
tories previously governed by Article 22 of the League Covenant.
Oppenheim supports this last statement.
Although, according to the wording, the charter
imposes no clear legal obligation upon States
which were mandatories by virtue of Article 22
of the Covenant to place the territories in
question under the system of trusteeship, it is
clear that an obligation to this effect, closely
approaching a legal duty, follows from the prin-
ciples of the Charter. ?°
This recognition is vitally important in determining Israel's
legal title to territorial sovereignty as of May 11, 1949. As
Oppenheim states:
In recognizing a new State as a member of the inter-
national community the existing States declare that
in their opinion the new State fulfills the condi-
tions of statehood as required by International Law.
In thus acting, the existing States perform, in the
full exercise of their discretion, a quasi- j udicial
function ....''
When one sees Oppenheim's definition of what constitutes
a state as an international person, the ramifications of recog-
nition become obvious. He lists the four elements of statehood
as constituting (1) a people, (2) a territory, (3) a
7 8government, (4) and sovereignty.' Recognition does not
confer sovereignty but accedes to the recognized states '
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territorial sovereignty regardless of how derived. An




...Recognition being retroactive and dating
back to the moment at which the newly recognized
Government established itself in power, its
effect is to preclude the courts of the recog-
nizing State from questioning the legality or
validity of such legislative and executive acts,
past and future, of that Government as are not
contrary to International Law; it therefore
validates, so far as concerns those courts of
law, certain transfers of property and other
transactions which before recognition the
courts would have treated as invalid. °0
One last point should be made here. While the majority
of the nations of the international community recognized
Israel's sovereignty over her territory the Arab states
refused to do so. While in itself this is not sufficient
to deny such legal sovereignty certain events since that
time provide a legal basis for complete agreement within
the international community.
The concept of acquiring title to territory through
prescription, i . e. , effective possession over a long period of
time, would seem to fit in this case. After the June 1967
War, the Arab states with the exception of Syria, accepted
U.N. Resolution 242, which called for Israel to withdraw to
her pre-1967 borders, as a basis for a peace settlement in
the Middle East. By accepting U.N. Resolution 242 as the
basis for a peaceful solution to the continuing Arab-Israeli
conflict, the Arab states, in effect, acquiesced to Israel's
effective control of her territory prior to the June 1967 War.
In the Island of Palmas Case (1928) concerning a dispute





The title of continguity, understood as a basis
of territorial sovereignty, has no basis in in-
ternational law.
The title of recognition by treaty does not
apply ... (T)he acquiescence of Spain in the
situation created after 1677 would deprive her
and her successors of the possibility of still
invoking conventional rights at the present time.
The Netherlands title of sovereignty, acquired by
continuous and peaceful display of State authority
during a long period of time going probably back
beyond the year 1700, therefore holds good.^1
While the period between 1949 and 1967 is relatively short,
there is no specific time designated to constitute "continu-
ous display of State authority during a long period of time."
However, the fact that the majority of nations within the
international community recognize Israel's claim to title
coupled with the Arab states' recognition of U.N. Resolution
242 as a basis for a peaceful settlement would indicate that
Israel's claim to sovereignty within limits defined prior to
1967 is valid. However, that territory acquired as a result
of belligerent action after the June 1967 War is another
matter and in this case sovereignty would seem to rest in
another principle of international law.
The principle in international law that a State cannot
acquire title over territory as a result of war is clearly
stated by Oppenheim.
Insofar as these instruments prohibit war, they
probably render invalid conquest on the part of
that State which has resorted to war contrary to
its obligations. An unlawful act cannot normally
produce results beneficial to the law-breaker.
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. ..(T)he so-called doctrine of non-recognition does
not render such conquest illegal; it is an announce-
ment of the intention, or the assumption of an obli-
gation, not to validate by an act of recognition a
claim to territorial title which originates in an
illegal act and which is, accordingly, itself
invalid. 82
If such is the case, then it would seem to apply in both
directions. This is, if Israel did not acquire title to the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip through conquest in 1967, then
neither did Jordan and Egypt, respectively, in 1949. This
would seem to indicate that legal sovereignty and title to
territory continued to remain in the indigeneous Palestinian
population and that Jordan, Egypt and Israel enjoyed rights
as military occupants and not sovereigns with regard to the
Occupied Territories. The fact that U.N. Resolution 242 calls
for Israel's withdrawal to her pre-1967 borders would seem to
be clear indication that the international community does not
recognize the acquisition of territory by Israel in the June
1967 War as conferring title to that territory. At the same
time, discussions within the U.N. and articles, books and
other publications as well as numerous electronic media events
treat the West Bank and the Gaza strip as being Palestinian
in nature as well as by demographic distribution and therefore
subject to a solution within some sort of Palestinian context.
This brings up an important point when dealing with the
question of sovereignty and title in a newly created Palestinian
state
.
In dealing with the question of sovereignty, The Digest
of International Law quotes Peaslee in determining the source
of sovereignty in a modern state.
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In general there are two prevailing concepts re-
garding the source of sovereign power: (1) that
sovereign power originates in the people them-
selves who elect their government institutions,
and (2) that sovereignty is vested in a monarch
or other supreme person, and stems downward as a
grant to the people.
' Sovereign People '
The language of the constitutions on this point
shows a substantial preponderance of opinion
favoring the concept that sovereignty rests in
the people. In sixty-six nations, constituting
about 71 percent of the total number of nations
and comprehending about 80 percent of the world's
total population, this concept appears in exist-
ing constitutional provisions...
In still others the concept of sovereign power
is that it rests more or less jointly in a
sovereign and the people. Included in this group
of nations are Afghanistan, Australia, Canada,
Ceylon, Denmark, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Pakistan, Sweden and the United Kingdom. If these
nations are added to the 66, the list becomes 77
nations; the percentage of the world's total popu-
lation who consider the people to be a source of
sovereign power becomes over 95 percent. 83
In those nations not included by Peaslee, perhaps the
concept of popular sovereignty still applies inasmuch as a
monarch cannot rule without the consent of the governed as
the Shah of Iran has so recently discovered.
Taken from such a viewpoint then, it is possible to en-
vision sovereign title to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
residing in the Palestinian people regardless of Israeli
occupation. In such a case Israel's title, as was Jordan's
and the United Kingdom before her, is merely transitory. In
this manner, then, Israel's duties with regard to her conduct
on the West Bank and Gaza are governed by the General Conven-
tions concerning a belligerent occupant. In such a fashion
Israel's position is very similar to Great Britain's during
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the time of the Palestinian Mandate and in lieu of a peace
treaty specifying otherwise Israel is not empowered to change
the status of that territory. Again, Oppenheim states:
...The principle underlying these modern rules is
that, although the occupant in no wise acquires
sovereignty over such territory through the mere
fact of having occupied it, he actually exercises
for the time being military authority over it. As
he thereby prevents the legitimate sovereign from
exercising his authority, and claims obedience for
himself from the inhabitants, he must administer
the country, not only in the interest of his own
military advantage, but also, at any rate so far
as possible, for the public benefit of the inhabi-
tants . Thus International Law not only gives rights
to an occupant, but also imposes duties upon him. 84
That this international policy is concident with United
States' policy is clearly indicated in Ambassador Stevenson's
comments to the General Assembly concerning the Status of Goa.
...(W)hat is at stake today is not colonialism,
it is a bold violation of one of the most basic
principles in the United Nation's Charter... We
realize fully the depths of differences between
India and Portugal concerning the future of Goa...
But if our Charter means anything, it means that
States are obliged to renounce the use of force,
are obliged to seek a solution of their differen-
ces by peaceful means, are obliged to utilize
the procedures of the United Nations when other
peaceful means have failed. 85
Again, when Israel attempted to annex the captured area of
Jerusalem, the U.N. General Assembly condemned the action by
a vote of 99 to and called on Israel to desist from such
«.. •+. 86activity
.
It must be remembered that sovereignty is independence to
act on the part of duly constituted government title to
territory is a function of the mode of acquisition of that
territory. The two become entwined when one considers that
the mode of acquisition of a given territory may be illegal
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and thus while a form of sovereignty is exercised over that
territory the international community of nations may not con-
sider that exercise of sovereign authority as legally consti-
tuted. Thus, in the case of Israel, U.N. Resolution 242
indicates that Israel's exercise of sovereign authority over
the West Bank is founded on an illegal mode of acquisition,
conquest. As such Israel does not enjoy legal title to the
West Bank and hence her exercise of sovereignty is considered
illegal
.
C. SOME POTENTIAL IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD
If sovereignty and title in the Occupied Territory can be
traced from the Turkish Empire to the present day people of
Palestine, that is the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, what
would be the possible result of a peace settlement and an
emerging nation of Palestine?
In the first place several important factors would accrue
as a result of recognition by the international community and
Oppenheim states that quite clearly.
Among the more important consequences which flow
from the recognition of a new Government or State
are these: (1) it thereby acquires the capacity
to enter into diplomatic relations with other
States and to make treaties with them; (2) within
limitations which are far from being clear, former
treaties (if any) concluded between the two States,
assuming it to be an old State and not a newly-
born one, are automatically revived and come into
force; (3) it thereby acquires the right, which,
at any rate according to English law, it did not
previously possess, of suing in the courts of law
of the recognizing State; (4) it thereby acquires
for itself and its property immunity from the juris-
diction of the courts of law of the State recogniz-
ing it and the ancillary rights which are discussed
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later - an immunity which, according to English
law at any rate, it does not enjoy before recog-
nition; (5) it also becomes entitled to demand
and receive possession of property situated
within the jurisdiction of a recognizing State,
which formerly belonged to the preceeding Govern-
ment at the time of its supersession. (6) Recog-
nition being retroactive and dating back to the
moment at which the newly recognized Government
established itself in power, its effect is to
preclude the courts of the recognizing State from
questioning the legality or validity of such legis-
lative and executive acts, past and future, of that
Government as are not contrary to International Law,
it therefore validates, so far as concerns those
courts of law, certain transfers of property and
other transactions which before recognition the
courts would have treated as invalid. ;
There are three important ramifications which come to mind
as a direct result of the recognition of a Palestinian State
as defined above by Oppenheim. The first is the legality of
legislative or executive acts not contrary to International
Law and the obvious effect of any legislative act which would
define Palestinian citizenship. By enacting legislation
defining Palestinian citizenship the new state could substan-
tially increase the size of its population by using recognized
international criteria for establishing immediate citizenship.
Such a law would not have to go to the extremes established by
Israel in her Law of the Return.
In analyzing the problems of dual nationality one can
easily envision a large and legally inflated Palestinian
nationality. The general concepts of acquiring nationality
are stated by Oppenheim.
Although it is at present for Municipal Law to de-
termine who is, and who is not, a subject of a
State, it is nevertheless of legal and practical
interest to ascertain how nationality can be ac-
quired according to the Minicipal Law of the
different States. There are five possible modes
of acquiring nationality, and, although no State
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is obliged to recognize all five, nevertheless
all States in practice do so. They are birth,
naturalization, reintegration, subjugation and
cession. 88
It is important to note here that in International Law
the determination of nationality has been largely left to
the discretion of the individual States as a manifestation
of its sovereignty. For the purposes of this paper only
acquisition by birth will be discussed inasmuch as by that
means alone the largest number of citizens would acquire
immediate Palestinian nationality. The situation in the
United States is a clear example.
By reason of differences between nationality
laws of various countries there are many persons
whose allegiance is claimed by two or more
states, or conversely, on whom the benefits of
nationality are conferred by two or more
countries. These conflicts arise principally
by reason of the fact that in some countries
nationality is governed by jus soli
,
i.e., it
originates by birth within the country; in
others, it is based on jus sanguinis
,
i.e.,
the child inherits the nationality of his parents
irrespective of the place of birth; and in still
others, like the United States, it may be predi-
cated on either jus soli or jus sanguinis . °^
In determining how this principle could effect Palestinian
citizenship, it must be remembered that in the case of class 'A'
mandates, no new nationality was conferred. The inhabitants
retained their own nationality by virtue of the fact that they
were considered to be on the verge of independence. This was
confirmed, in the case of Palestine, by the British mandatory
government when the British Order in Council of July 24, 1925,
90declared Palestinian citizenship. In fact Palestinian
citizenship continued to exist in Israel until July 14, 1952,
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when the State of Israel finally put her nationality law into
c* * 91effect
.
Thus, there are thousands of people living throughout the
world who were either born in Palestine and thus could be
called Palestinian citizens as a result of the principle of
jus soli or who were born outside of Palestine of Palestinian
parents and who could, therefore, be awarded citizenship under
the principle of jus sangeinis . Another variation of this
principle would be the case where a minor, born in Palestine,
was taken from that country due to hostitil ities and elected
to return after attaining majority. Acquiring another nation-
ality would not prevent the individual from claiming Palestinian
citizenship. This was clearly pointed out in the Elg Case where
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that in the case
of minor children the child still retains the right of election
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upon achieving majority.
Probably one of the more far-reaching aspects of the emer-
gence and international recognition of a Palestinian State would
be the right to sue in the courts of the recognizing State as
mentioned earlier. Assuming that, as part of a peace settle-
ment, Israel and Palestine would exchange recognition, there
is a substantial claim which still exists concerning the loss
of Palestinian property and just compensation for the same as
a result of hostilities in 1948-49 and the occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip after 1967.
It is clear under Article 46 of the Hague Regula-
tions of 1907 that immovable private property may not be con-
fiscated or sold by the belligerent force and further states
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in Article 53 that movable private property which is lawfully
confiscated as material which has military application must
93
either be returned or compensation provided. One would
expect this to be a normal part of any peace treaty between
Israel and Palestine. However, inasmuch as the conflict has
continued for decades and not all claims can be anticipated
it is reasonable to expect a substantial volume of litigation
in Israeli courts as a result of any peace settlement. If,
on the other hand, the new state arose as a result of general
revolt or some other means in which a peace settlement is not
achieved, then one could expect the new Palestinian government
to use international organizations as a means of obtaining
compensation for property lost to Israel. In either case U.N.
General Assembly Resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 and
302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 are but two of the many such resolu-
tions calling for Israel to repatriate and compensate Palestinian
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refugees for damages and property lost or confiscated.*'
Finally, a third important effect of a newly recognized
Palestinian state would be the right through executive agree-
ments to exchange diplomats and enter in a regional organiza-
tion such as the Arab League. This is well within the perogative
of a state as is clearly indicated in Chapter VIII Article 52
of the Charter:
Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements, Article 52
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the
existence of regional arrangements or agencies
for dealing with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security
as are appropriate for regional action, provided
that such arrangements or agencies and their
activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations. 95
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In fact, one should expect the Palestinians to take such
action as a full and equal member of the Arab League. However,
it cannot be expected that the Israeli government would be
enthralled at such a development.
In summary it can be seen that an emergent Palestinian
state would have full claim to sovereignty and legal title
to her territory from the Turkish Empire through the Mandate
System and Israeli occupation to the present time. It is also
clear that numerous benefits not now available to Palestinians
would accrue as a result of independence and that those bene-
fits which would have the most immediate impact on an inter-
national scale would be nationality laws, claims for compensation
as a result of years of hostility with Israel and alliance
formation with other Arab nations in the Middle East.
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Ill . ISRAEL AS A "MANDATORY" GOVERNMENT
A. BACKGROUND
Ever since the Palestinian Mandate was issued to Great
Britain in 1922, that area or portions of that area have been
under foreign domination. As mentioned previously, just prior
to the British evacuation of Palestine the United States had
introduced the concept of a U.N. trusteeship in Palestine to
replace the British. After the 1948-49 War, Jordan annexed
the West Bank and administered the area until it was lost to
the Israelis in 1967. Since then the heart of any peace
settlement has been who would administer the West Bank until
a Palestinian entity could assume a role as leader of its own
destiny. In discussions today, the Israelis insist on admin-
istering this area until some form of autonomy can be estab-
lished, yet, Palestinians, most especially the Palestinian
Liberation Organization, are vociferous in their rejection of
Israeli proposals.
Perhaps the crux of the issue has two important facets.
In the first place, the Israelis claim the need for secure
borders for their own self-protection and indicate that only
they can ensure this. The Palestinians, on the other hand,
chafe under Israeli control. The issue has also had reper-
cussions within Israel itself both in terms of what is nec-
essary to achieve a lasting peace and the manner in which
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this occupied territory has been administered by the govern-
ment .
To see if an Israeli "trusteeship" is really a viable
concept, one must look at past Israeli policy in the Occupied
Territories and the best example of this is the Administration
of the West Bank, for as the British experience taught in the
early years, if the inhabitants are adamantly opposed to the
mandatory power, then self-government, if achieved at all, is
brought about only after long years of protracted bloodshed
and the result is often less than satisfactory.
B. ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION OF THE WEST BANK
As soon as the cease fire was established, the Israelis
turned to the administration of the newly captured territories.
Since they gained the West Bank through military conquest,
Israel established a military administration which accepted
as its goal the rapid normalization of the West Bank keeping
in mind the twin objectives of providing security for the
area and yet, ensuring minimal interference in the daily lives
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of the Palestinian inhabitants.
In rapid succession the Military Government of the West
Bank, responsible to the Central Command of the Israel Defense
Force (IDF), set about to reactivate basic health and welfare
services. Water and power were quickly restored and telephones
were operating within four months. The Israelis not only re-
established postal services but vastly improved the system.
97
This was true of all other utilities.
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In compliance with the Geneva Convention, the Military
Government, through the ministries of Health and Social
Welfare, provided services to the Palestinians in the West
Bank. Within a few months hospitals and clinics were seeing
patients and the government aided international relief agencies
9 8in organizing assistance to the war-torn area.
The Military Government found that re-establishing the
educational system and providing legal services were hampered
by Arab teachers and lawyers who organized a strike in protest
of the occupation and the Israeli government's control of the
educational and judicial systems. The government responded
by allowing the teachers more authority in the administration
of the Jordanian school system on the West Bank. However, the
Arab lawyers refused to plead cases before the courts and the
government, therefore, permitted Israeli lawyers to plead
cases in Arab courts. Two Arab judges unsuccessfully
challenged this order and it continued to be a point of




Finally, the local police force had to be created from
whole cloth since most of the Arab policemen fled in advance
of the Israeli Army and refused to return. Therefore, the
Military Government recruited and trained a force of almost
300 West Bank Arabs to provide police services. This force
was augmented by the same number of Arab- speaking Israeli
, - 100policemen
.
The structure for administering the West Bank begins with
the West Bank Military Commander who exercises control through
the six district offices. The key civilian sections are

Administration and Services, and Economic Affairs. The levels
below the Military Commander are a mix of military, civilian
and Arab officials with local mayors exercising more authority
than they had under Jordanian rule. The whole structure is
backed by the Israeli Army.
In administrative matters the local inhabitants have rela-
tively little difficulty with the occupying powers. In general,
the Israeli administration is more efficient than the previous
Jordanian rule and difficulties which arise in this area are
usually a result of national pride.
Such changes (administrative streamlining), although
increasing the system's efficiency, could well be
resented by the Arab residents, who might view the
Israeli officials as meddlers exercising arbitrary
powers and damaging the Arabs' national dignity and
self-confidence. To the degree that Israelis were
able to offer advice and make changes with regard ,«,
for Arab sensibilities, such resentment was avoided.
Regarding the Israeli government's policy concerning settle-
ments and the Military Government's actions in dealing with
security problems there is a serious conflict between the local
Arab inhabitants and the Jewish state. There have been count-
less books, newpaper articles and essays in periodicals con-
cerning the Israeli government's handling of security problems
and its alleged violations of human rights in the West Bank.
C. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
In general, the documents which provide specific guidance
and intent in the area of human rights are Article 56 of the
United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights adopted in 1948, and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949
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regarding the status of civilians and prisoners of war.
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a
statement of policy, the following three conventions provide
treaty status to that document: the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
10 7
of Genocide.
Specific violations of these rights by Israeli occupying
forces were indicated in the first report of a special com-
mittee established by the U.N. General Assembly to investigate
these alleged human rights violations.
After reviewing the Special Committee's first report,
the General Assembly called upon Israel on December
20, 1971 to 'desist from all practices and policies
such as :
'
(a) The annexation of any part of the occupied Arab
territories
;
(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements on
those territories and the transfer of parts of
its civilian population into the occupied
territory
;
(c) The destruction and demolition of villages,
quarters and houses and the confiscation and
expropriation of property;
(d) The evacuation, transfer, deportation and ex-
pulsion of the inhabitants of the occupied
territories
(e) The denial of the right of the refugees and
displaced persons to return to their homes;





That these violations are widely accepted as true is
readily apparent when reading even Israeli newspapers.
However, several key issues are extremely inflamatory and seen
as very detrimental to Israel's international position.
Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories and es-
pecially the West Bank continue to strain relations with
Israel and her only true ally, the United States. Yet,
Israeli leaders insist that they will not give up the West
Bank to a Palestinian homeland. These settlements, es-
tablished through confiscation of Arab lands, are a continuing
10 7problem for Arabs and Israelis alike. However, other viola-
tions of human rights are equally deplorable.
Administrative detection, the policy of holding suspected
Arab activists for up to six months without trial (detention
can be extended, and often is, for longer periods with approval
from higher authority) is considered to be a growing problem
in the West Bank. In a report submitted to the Senate Sub-
committee on Foreign Assistance the U.S. State Department wrote
There are two aspects of incarceration of the local
inhabitants by the Israeli occupation authorities
that are important from the human rights viewpoint:
the relatively high number of cases of imprisonment
on security charges, a situation arising from the
political conflict caused by the occupation; and the
use of administrative detention . 10°
That report goes on to list six specific violations of the
Geneva Convention which are characteristic of the Military
Government's administration of the West Bank. Such violations
as collective punishment, deportation of suspected terrorists
and instances of summary proceedings against potential Arab
109
activists appear to be commonplace in the West Bank.
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D. ISRAELI ATTITUDES TOWARD PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS
Michael Goldstein, writing in the Middle East Journal,
defines the problem in legal and moral terms.
Administrative detention, along with demolition of
homes, is one of the more controversial Israeli
security measures employed in the Occupied Terri-
tories. It is controversial not only among the
Palestinian Arabs against whom detention is used,
but also among Israeli Jews. The major reason
for this controversy is that administrative deten-
tion violates one of the most basic safeguards of
the individual which makes it illegal to arrest
and imprison people on 'the speculation that an
individual may be dangerous in the future .' H®
It is easy to identify the impact of such activity on the
Palestinian Arabs. Instead of pacifying the Arab population
or increasing the security of the area, it only recruits new
members into the Palestinian Liberation Organization and
generally incites the population against the occupying power.
An even cursory review of American involvement in Vietnam
supports this point.
This repressive activity has an even more detrimental
effect on Israelis. As an example, last May 3rd, 1978 Israel
Defense Minister Weizman was forced to fire Brig. Gen. David
Hagoel and discipline several other officials for using tear
gas in a locked classroom of an Arab girls' school. Such
conduct forces more sensitive Israelis to disavow knowledge
of such affairs
.
'You won't believe me,' said an Israeli official in
Jerusalem, unconnected with military government,
'when I tell you that we often don't have any idea
of what goes on just five or six miles from here.
But it' s true. '112
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If such activity offends many Israeli Jews and their
American supporters (and it does) , then why does the govern-
ment persist in such an unpopular posture? Seymore M. Lipset,
in his essay, "The Israeli Dilemma," addresses part of the
problem.
The depressed situation of the Palestinian Arabs,
the limited participation of Israeli Arabs in the
cultural, economic and political activities of the
state, and the military weaknesses displayed by the
Arab states and their guerrillas, combine to rein-
force the negative stereotypes of Arabs held by most
Jewish Israelis. Opinion polls by local organiza-
tions, and by the Louis Harris survey conducted by
NEWSWEEK earlier this year, indicate clearly that
the majority of the Jews regard the Arabs as an
inferior people. ^'
That this negative stereotype, as discussed by Lipset, exists
even among intellectual Jewish writers is clearly evident in
the last paragraph of Raphael Patai ' s essay "Western and
Oriental Culture in Israel" which appears in the same publi-
cation .
Looking forward to, say, the year 2000, I can foresee
an Israeli population which will be genetically
largely Sephardi-Oriental while culturally largely
Western. Within the general Middle Eastern context
this will mean that in the very midst of the Arab
sea there will be a tiny island, Israel, which while
genetically not too different from the Arab-Muslin
world, will be a bastion of modern Western culture
in the middle of a world area which at that time
will foreseeably still be struggling to modernize,
industrialize and democratize . 114
If this attitude is held by most Jews, then is it reason-
able to assume that such a mide-set is the basis for current
government policy on the West Bank? How does this square with
the growing peace movement, and certainly there is a growing
clamour for peace within Israel which involves some sort of
radical departure from Prime Minister Begin' s policy vis a vis
77

the West Bank? Undoubtedly, President Sadat's visit to Israel





Perhaps, there is an even deeper issue which goes to the
heart of every Jew in Israel. Isaac states in her book that
the growth of ideology in Israeli politics has served to focus
the basic issues of that state's formation and the future
shape of Israel as a nation.
Thus, almost all of the parties could easily break
asunder under the stress of coming to basic de-
cisions on the national issue. For ultimately,
although the issue of policy toward the Arabs and
the territories could be called one of 'foreign
policy,' it was a national issue-one which
involve the definition of the state of Israel,
the nature of its tasks as a nation, and the goals
Tin
of its existence . -LU
Thus the Land of Israel Movement and the peace movement
represent opposite sides of the same issue. Since Likud and
the National Religious Party form the heart of the present
coalition government which opposes withdrawal from the West
Bank is repressive towards Arabs and encourages Jewish settle-
ments, even in the face of negative world opinion, one must
draw the conclusion that under the Begin government an Arab
state acceptable to Palestinians would not be acceptable to
the Israeli government. However, given the strength of
external pressure from the super powers, continued Arab
guerrilla activity, the military and economic burden of ad-
ministering the West Bank, and the maintenance of Anwar Sadat's
conciliatory stance, the peace movement may grow stronger as
Israelis become disenchanted with Begin' s intransigent stance.
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Whatever the outcome one can't help but see that Israelis
are wrestling with the ideological problems of their future
course of history and events on the West Bank will continue
to reflect this struggle.
E. CONCLUSIONS
Perhaps the important point is that the Israelis are too
close to the problem to provide an effective administration
of the area. The issues are too real, the contending philoso-
phies within the country are somewhat reminiscent of the
British predicament in which policy decisions tended to wax
between pro-Jewish and pro-Arab contingents or in this case
between a hardline policy of Israeli control or a more con-
ciliatory attitude. Added to this is the tendency of a large
number of Israelis to view Arabs as ethnically inferior. In
short, it would appear that, all other things being equal,
the past policy of the Israeli government concerning adminis-
tration of the West Bank, would seem to obviate the necessity
for selecting a neutral government or a joint body under the
auspices of the United Nations to act as trustee until a
Palestinian state could be established.
Be that as it may, by U.N. Resolution 242 the international
community has indicated that it considers Israel's title to
the Occupied Territories and exercise of sovereign authority
to be illegal. Furthermore, the various investigating com-
mittees sent by the U.N. have analyzed the plight of Palestinians
with regard to various conventions on human rights and the
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Geneva Convention regarding the status of citizens and prisoners
of war. This further supports the contention that Israel is a
military occupant and not a legally constituted government in
the Occupied Territories. As such her rights in that area are
restricted and violations of Palestinian rights only exacerbate
the situation. Long and continuous exercise of authority, in
itself, does not constitute legal title. U.N. Resolution 242
has not been rescinded and unless the international community
changes its attitude toward Israel's occupation of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israel's claims to that area are
null and void. Therefore, her rights and duties in the area




The previous chapters of this thesis have looked briefly
at some of the key documents in the light of their historical
context that have been influential in the division of the
former mandated territory of Palestine and the formation of
the smaller State of Israel within that territory. In addition,
the legal background of many of these documents and the validity
in international law of certain events concerning the history
of Palestine and Israel have been analyzed to determine the
basis for Israel's existence in international law and the justi-
fication for a new Palestinian State in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. Concomitant with this analysis has been the dis-
cussion of certain important and immediate effects resulting
from an emerging Palestinian State. Finally, a brief glimpse
of Israeli administrative procedures in the West Bank, as the
military occupant, seems to indicate that there are serious
questions as to the wisdom of Israel's policies in the Occupied
Territories and her actual capacity as transitory sovereign
to preside over the emergence of a Palestinian State. What,
then, are the conclusions one might reasonably draw from such
an analysis?
In reviewing the legal history of Palestine in the preceding
pages, it appears that the arguments for the basis of sovereign
authority and legal title to the territory go hand in hand.
Turkey exercised sovereign authority and enjoyed legal title
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to the area until the end of WW I at which time Great Britain
acquired limited sovereignty and title as a result of completed
conquest. Initially her authority was limited due to her
status as a military occupant. After the establishment of
the League of Nations her authority was limited by that inter-
national body and the terms of the Palestine Mandate. From
the end of WWII until she relinquished her responsibilities
for the area, her sovereign authority was limited by the
United Nations which assumed responsibility for the administra-
tion of the mandates territories. That the U.N. enjoyed this
right is supported by the various decisions arising out of the
South-West Africa Cases .
Although Israel acquired a portion of Palestine through
conquest, her legal exercise of sovereign authority and title
to territory results both from recognition through the inter-
national community collectively when she was admitted as a
member-nation into the U.N. and individually through recogni-
tion by the majority of nations throughout the world. Con-
comitantly, Arab Palestinians, as a group, lost sovereign
title to that portion of Palestine conquered by the Jews in
1948-49.
However, Palestinians appear to have retained legal title
to that area of Palestine now occupied by the Israelis as a
result of the 1967 War. This is due to the fact that the U.N.
does not recognize Israel's claim to the area and continues
to insist that U.N. Resolution 242 must be the basis for a
peaceful settlement between Arabs and Israelis. Unless the
international community changes its attitude and recognizes
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Israel as the legal sovereign of the Occupied Territories,
Israeli claims based on historical title or long and con-
tinuous exercise of authority cannot be accorded any legal
status. In the absence of such international recognition
for Israel, a Palestinian state would, thereby, be able to
claim legal sovereignty and title to territory.
Another of the insights that seems to emerge from the
preceding pages is that the contending parties have been and
continue to operate from emotionally charged and diametrically
opposed philosophical bases. The Jews of Israel, as well as
many Jews throughout the world, view that nation as their
birthright, their land as promised to them by God. The Arabs,
and most especially the Palestinian Arabs, view the area as
traditionally theirs and view themselves as the indigeneous
native population and conversely see the Jews as colonial
invaders imposed on the Palestinians by Western super-powers.
Thus, the whole issue is so emotionally charged that legal
niceties, while very often are of substantial importance, are
viewed as just that by the Palestinians, especially and by
many Israelis as well when the justification of a Palestinian
state in the Occupied Territories is mentioned.
What is seen here is a classic conflict of cultures.
Israeli Jews represent modern, Western colonial interference
from outside. This Arab perception is somewhat understandable
when viewed in the light of the Palestinian Mandate's history.
Certainly the rhetoric of self-determination for emerging
peoples which followed the First World War seems to have been
merely that, rhetoric. It is not difficult to comprehend that
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Arabs might feel deceived by Western powers when such docu-
ments such as the King-Crane Commission report and the various
Royal Commission reports clearly delineated the desires of the
indigeneous population yet were virtually ignored by the
Mandatory Power.
Although the responsibility for the unfolding of admini-
strative policy in Palestine lies with the Mandatory power,
Great Britain and her allies to some degree, the immediate
benefactors, the Jewish community, both within and outside
Palestine, bears equal responsibility by cooperating with
such policies. As such, the Israelis are reaping the seeds
of this cooperation by carrying on with the same types of
discriminatory practices as mentioned earlier and the harvest
of such activity is continued strife. Perhaps, no case so
clearly indicated this clash of cultures as the case of the
Status of Goa and the contending philosophies between the
Western nations and the Third World.
Mr. Jha, the Indian Ambassador to the U.N., contended that
Indian military occupation of Goa was not illegal and that
Portugal's 450 years occupation of that area was a result of
colonial imperialism and, therefore, subject to redress by
India
.
That is the situation we have to face. If any
narrow-minded legalistic cons iderations-
-
considerations arising from international law
as written by European law writers- - should arise,
these writers were, after all, brought up in the
atmosphere of colonialism. I pay all respect due
to Grotius, who is supposed to be the father of
international law, and we accept many tenets of
international law. They are certainly regulating
international life today. But the tenet which...
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is quoted in support of Colonial Powers having
sovereign rights over territories which they
won by conquest in Asia and Africa is no longer
acceptable. It is the European concept and it
must die. It is time, in the twentieth century,
that it died. . .
.
117
Mr. Garin, the Portuguese Ambassador to the U.N., responded
...Indian attempts to annex the territories of
the other sovereignties in the neighborhood
cannot find any legal justification. Such
attempts could be legitimized only by the
other sovereignties concerned, if they agreed
to a formal transfer of their territories, but
only if the transfer could be voluntary, never
compulsory, much less by means of an armed
aggression. It matters little whether those
other sovereignties are held by white or
coloured people... It likewise matters little
if the territories belonging to those other
sovereignties are large or small in size. The
principle of sovereignty ought to be respected.
The Indian Union has not done this in respect
of the Portuguese State of India and is, there-
fore, guilty of a base breach of international
law
.
It has been said that international law in its
present form was made by Europeans. I submit
that, so long as it is not replaced, it must
be accepted and followed by civilized nations,
and I am not aware that international law re-
lating to sovereignty has been changed so far...118
Thus, the philosophical differences cannot be ignored and,
in general, the conflict between Third World nations and
Western nations is seen in a colonial setting in which inter-
national law is a construct of the European culture designed
to justify its colonial ambitions. In the particular, the
Arab-Israeli conflict is seen in this light by the Arabs.
Events of history have only served to reinforce this attitude
among Palestinian Arabs and the conduct of the Israeli admini-




Nevertheless, in the absence of any other form of inter-
national law acceptable to all parties, the rules that govern
the conduct of modern nations must be applied whenever and
wherever possible. Thus, in the introduction to the third





. . .One of the most important principles of the
United Nations Charter is that past grievances,
no matter how deeply felt, may not be the basis
for unilateral coercion to right the perceived
wrong. Lawful unilateral coercion is restricted
to individual and collective defense. The Charter
thus rightly incorporates the present behavioral
understanding that perceptions usually differ
about the justice or injustice of particular
events. The Charter also embodies the judgment
that war always has been a destructive mode of
change but that in the present international
system it flirts with global catastrophe. Ac-
cordingly, the Charter principle that force
should not be used as an instrument of national
policy except in defense must be considered in
any thoughtful appraisal of international
disputes . 119
If such is the case then, in the absence of international
acceptance, Israel cannot claim sovereign title to the Occupied
Territories either through conquest or an historical connection.
By the same rule, then, neither can Palestinians, no matter
how unfairly grieved in the past, claim title to the State of
Israel. As stated previously, it's existence has been approved,
albeit reluctantly in some instances, by the international
community of nations and its status is, therefore, not legally
subject to change except through pacific means.
By this principle then, Israel is obliged to facilitate
her evacuation of the Occupied Territories as soon as practica-
ble, having provided in some manner for the effective self-
government of the Palestinian people. This may be accomplished
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in various ways; however, in light of the psychological
alienation of the contending parties as a result of present
and past interaction between Palestinians and Israelis, it
would seem judicious if the mechanism for self-government be
accomplished by a third party under the direct supervision
of the United Nations. Applying the identical concept to
an emergent Palestinian State would require that State to
accept Israel's title to that territory now recognized by the
United Nations.
One final but most important area must be addressed when
discussing recognition and sovereignty concerning both Israel
and Palestine. In the previous chapters "areas" of territory
were discussed in dealing with sovereignty and territorial
acquisition, not delineated boundaries. This was done purposely
to avoid mixing the question of boundaries with the basic concept
of sovereignty and recognition thereof. This is an important
distinction in that the question of sovereignty may be discussed
in the main while boundary disputes may be treated as an
appurtenance to the central issue. Thus Jennings writes in his
book, Acquisition of Territory in International Law :
It is not surprising that we find, therefore, that
a large part of territory is about frontier or
boundary questions; and though these clearly involve
title yet it is also a problem on its own, with its
own special rules and conventions . In private law
everybody readily recognizes the difference between
the type of case where X and Y are in dispute over
the ownership of Whiteacre, and the type of dispute
where the undoubted owner of Whiteacre is in dispute
with the undoubted owner of Blackacre over the line
of the boundary between them. But in international
law the distinction has not always been so clear,
though as early as the Mosul Boundary case, the
P. C.I. J. showed that a principal title may be deter-
mined even before the territorial boundaries are
precisely established. 12 ^
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In the case of the United States' recognition of Israel
exception was stated concerning Israel's title to Jerusalem
and this principle continues to apply. This reservation is
a result of the U.N. General Assembly's decision in the form
of three resolutions to create a corpus separatum in the case
of Jerusalem, making it an international territory under the
administration of the United Nations. The fact that the
United States Government supports this position is clear in
a Department of State press release (576) dated July 22, 1952.
The Government of the United States has noted
with concern the decision and announcement of
the Israel Government on May 4, 1952, to move
the Foreign Office to Jerusalem. The Govern-
ment of the United States has adhered and con-
tinues to adhere to the policy that there should
be a special international regime for Jerusalem
which will not only provide protection for the
holy places but which will be acceptable to
Israel and Jordan as well as the world
community
.
Since the question of Jerusalem is still of
international importance the U.S. Government
believes that the United Nations should have
an opportunity to reconsider the matter with
a view of devising a status for Jerusalem which
will satisfactorily preserve the interests of
the world community and the states directly
concerned. Consequently, the U.S. Government
would not view favorably the transfer of the
Foreign Office to Jerusalem. The Government
of the United States also wishes to convey
that in view of its attitude on the Jerusalem
question, it has no present intention of trans-
ferring the Ambassador of the United States and
his staff to Jerusalem. 122
Therefore, it is legally possible, in principles as well
as fact, for the United States to recognize an emergant
Palestinian State and withhold recognition of title to certain
areas previously deemed to be under the auspices of the United
Nations. This would be of critical importance if Israel and
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Palestine reached a formal agreement concerning Jerusalem
which was not in consonance with the wishes of the other
member states of the United Nations. According to the
wording of the U.N. resolutions previously mentioned and
the policy of the United States, the status of Jerusalem
is subject to international determination and not merely a
bilateral treaty between Israel and Palestine. However, the
principle of recognizing a state in spite of the fact that
her borders are in dispute is important in that the new
state is presumed to be equal to all other states in the
international community and is, therefore, fully competent
to participate in any decisions regarding its common border
122
with another state.
As discussed earlier, the evacuation of the Occupied
Territories by the Government of Israel in favor of a more
disinterested third nation under the supervision of the
United Nations would seem to have substantial benefits for
the belligerent parties as well as the international community
in general. The Israeli Government has been understandably
reluctant to deal with the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) for a variety of reasons not the least of which is the
fact that such dealings could grant the PLO the legal status
1 ? 4
of belligerent and thus the concomitant rights of a belligerent.
It is much more advantageous for Israel to treat the PLO as
a terrorist organization.
However, although the United Nations has not formally recog-
nized the PLO as a belligerent in the legal sense, it has
granted U.N. observer status to that organization and permitted
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the PLO to send a non-voting representative (observer) to the
United Nations. As such, the U.N. has direct links with PLO
while Israel does not. Inasmuch as the PLO represents a sub-
stantial number of Palestinians and it is a primary source of
armed resistance to Israeli administration of the Occupied
Territories, its importance cannot be ignored.
By allowing a "trustee" nation and the United Nation to
deal with all Palestinians, including Yasir Arafat of the PLO,
a new Palestinian State could be formed through direct elec-
tions reflecting the Jeffersonian principle of the will of
the people, substantially declared. At the same time the
"trustee" nation would be responsible for ensuring the
security of Israeli borders in cooperation with the United
Nations
.
This has several advantages. In the first place it would
remove the direct confrontation of Arabs and Israelis in the
administrative process of the Occupied Territories. The
animosity between these two groups has such a long history,
as briefly described in earlier pages, that it is unlikely
that any transition can take place peacefully without the use
of a third party.
In the second place, it allows the Israeli Government to
continue in its policy of refusing to deal with the PLO. If,
on the other hand, the claims of the PLO to unanimous support
of Palestinians is substantiated by the election of Yasir
Arafat as the head of the new government, then any dealings
between Israel's Prime Minister and Yasir Arafat would be
as equals. This has obvious advantages for the Palestinian
90

Government but it also allows the Israelis the face-saving
posture of dealing with a legitimate head of government and
not a terrorist leader. It also effectively co-opts the PLO
.
Any agreement reached between Palestinians which would exclude
the PLO is not only unlikely but could be expected to continue
the war inasmuch as the PLO could not be expected to stand by
while a separate agreement is concluded which ignores the only
organized resistance to Israeli occupation.
In summation, it can be seen through the modern history
of Jews and Palestinian Arabs that this contest and its legal
documents are a reflection of two contending views of inter-
national law or more aptly, the view held by a large number
of Third World nations that modern international law is merely
a device used by the industrialized West to practice and
justify a modern form of colonialism. Going beyond that
perception, however, one can see that the process of tracing
legal, sovereign title to a territory has been made difficult
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